


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27 May 1982

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2552



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27 May 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2552

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EGYPTIAN ACQUISITION OF ISRAELI SINAI ASSETS REPORTED

Egypt Pays \$7.5 Million

TA261237 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Apr 82 p 1

[Report by Eytan Rabin]

[Text] The Egyptians acquired the assets in southern Sinai for a lump sum of \$7.5 million. All the assets were acquired through the offices and mediation of the Joint Military Committee. This was learned by DAVAR's correspondent from a senior tourism ministry source.

DAVAR's correspondent has a list of the assets that were bought by the Egyptians: The Tzuk Hotel in Sharm ash-Shaykh, the Marina Hotel [location not given], the three scuba diving clubs in Na'ama, the Youth Hostel, the school and the terminal in Sharm ash-Shaykh, the resort village in Nevi'ot and the public beach in Ofira.

Some of the assets will be operated by Israeli advisers in conjunction with the Egyptians.

Sinai Moshav Returned Undemolished

TA021543 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 May 82 p 3

[Text] The Ne'ot Sinai Moshav, a Betar Movement Cooperative Moshav in the Yamit district, was not demolished along with the rest of the agricultural settlements and the city of Yamit in the Yamit district, but was in fact handed over to the Egyptians without charge with its dwellings and buildings intact. Actually, only the greenhouses were dismantled in the course of the withdrawal. The houses, including the one that had been designated as Prime Minister Begin's, were left intact and handed over to the Egyptians with the withdrawal.

Our correspondent, who traveled yesterday on the northern Sinai road and passed what had been Ne'ot Sinai, learned that Israel left intact not only the homes in the Moshav but also the laundry.

The governor of the northern Sinai, on behalf of the Egyptian military government, made his first visit yesterday to Ne'ot Sinai and examined the houses that will serve as the Egyptian governor's new headquarters.

Egyptian, MFO Purchases From Israel

TA291432 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 29 Apr 82 p 3

[Report by Military Correspondent Mordekhay Barqay]

[Text] The DAVAR correspondent has learned that Egypt has purchased from Israel the assets left in the Sinai for the sum of \$27.5 million, and the Multinational Force and Observers [MFO] has bought equipment from Israel and paid wages for the sum total of \$54 million.

Egypt purchased from Israel, among other things, navigation equipment and fuel tanks from the airports, houses, contents of hotels, gas stations, army's barracks, diving clubs facilities and agricultural equipment (from Nevi'ot).

The procurement was effected via the joint Israeli-Egyptian delegation, with the participation of the finance ministry's representatives and the southern Sinai district executive. Egypt has already paid 70 percent of the value of its purchases. The payments are transferred to the finance ministry, which then settles with the former Israeli owners of these assets.

Egypt also "purchased" from Israel the construction of the border terminal (carried out by the airports authority) for the sum of \$4.5 million.

The MFO, whose major bases are in Etam and the Na'ama Gulf, procured from Israel equipment left at the airports worth \$6 million, additional equipment and property worth \$22 million, as well as ordering work worth \$26 million. The MFO continues to buy materials from Israel, with orders worth \$5 million. All these orders were effected also through the Israeli-Egyptian Military Committee, which took care to insure that the rights of the Israeli contractors and workers were maintained in the tenders, and, indeed, Israeli companies won most of the tenders.

Israel Rebuilds 'Ezyon Terminal

TA301156 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 12

[Report by Aviation Affairs Correspondent 'Amos Haddad]

[Text] The regional passenger terminal at the 'Ezyon airfield, which was destroyed prior to the withdrawal, was rebuilt for the Egyptians by the Israeli airports authority.

The authority managed to rebuild it during the Passover holiday, at Egypt's request.

The building will be used by Egypt's Air Sinai Airline during its weekly stops at the 'Ezyon airfield. The first flight is scheduled for the beginning of next week.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RAFAH BORDER RESIDENTS WANT RELOCATION IN GAZA

TA041143 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 May 82 p 3

[Text] A number of Rafah families whose houses are on the border with the fence dividing their rooftops have expressed their desire to leave those homes and move to another place in the Gaza Strip.

DAVAR has learned that the Israeli authorities are prepared to help these families set up roots in other places, either by way of compensating them or by finding them alternative residential places by incorporating them in the build-your-own-home plans like those for the Bedouin in (Dahiniyah), in the very center of Rafah town itself, on its Israeli side.

The families that are ready to leave their homes on the border are doing this because the partitioning of the houses by fences, the sealing of windows and doors on the Egyptian side as well as some more difficulties imposed by the Egyptian authorities have turned life along the border into a miserable affair.

DAVAR points out that in the negotiations for demarcating the border in the town of Rafah, Israel had tried to avoid demolishing houses, but now, as the homes along the border are being deserted by their inhabitants of their free accord, they will be destroyed and this will make it possible for the Israeli authorities to increase the security supervision of this sensitive urban borderline.

As reported by the DAVAR correspondent in the south, Bedouin from the Sinai have already penetrated the new border fence near Yamit, infiltrated into settlements in the south, stealing agricultural equipment and smuggling it back through openings in the fence.

The Israeli authorities are examining the Egyptian authorities' attitudes toward this two-way smuggling phenomenon, which has been exploited in the past by the terrorists as a means to introduce arms and explosives into the Gaza Strip.

CSO: 4400/258

ISRAELI PAPER ON WORKINGS OF JORDANIAN-PLO COMMITTEE

TA301712 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 8

[Report by Tzvi Zinger]

[Text] The great importance with which the Arab states regard the joint Jordanian-PLO committee can be learned from the composition of this committee, which sits in Amman.

The head of the PLO side of the committee is Khalid Abu-Sittah, head of the PLO's occupied homeland department. However in the sessions of the wider forum, which until recently were held bimonthly and which are now held monthly, "Abu Jihad," Yasir 'Arafat's deputy and head of the PLO's military arm, personally takes part.

The head of the Jordanian side in the committee, at least as it appears outwardly, is the Jordanian Government Minister for the Affairs of the Occupied Lands, Hasan Ibrahim. However, the "strong man" is Shawkat Mahmud, who until recently was the director general of the same ministry.

Meanwhile, under the surface there are numerous differences of opinion and tensions between the two sides of the committee. Each side wants most of the funds to be channeled to its supporters in the territories, and not to the supporters of the other side. In the PLO itself there is opposition on the part of the extremist factions to the very existence of the committee, because of the argument that participation in it denotes recognition of the Hashemite government in Jordan. The Fatah--the chief supporter of participation in the committee--argues that it is not a political body, but only a means of channeling funds.

Although the committee is the principal channel for the injection of funds, there also exist other channels, chief among them the Saudi Jerusalem Fund, which allocates funds independently. Another way funds are injected is through twin city alliances established between towns in Judaea and Samaria and cities in the Persian Gulf.

It was learned recently that following the EEC's Venice declaration the PLO has been trying to relay funds to the West Bank by way of the common market countries. According to these reports, the amount in question is around \$4 million.

CSO: 4400/258

SYRIANS STEP UP SUPPORT TO GOLAN DRUZE

Ash-Shak'ah Implicated in Fund Transfer

TA021632 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 2 May 82

[Text] Syria has begun funneling funds to the Golan Druze. This comes only a few months after the Druze first refused to accept Israeli identification cards. The sums, apparently not large, are transferred to the Druze through the Arab bank in Amman and through the Jordan River bridges as part of the Syrian support for the Druze struggle. Our military correspondent, Hayim Ravya, has learned that former Nablus Mayor Bassam Ash-Shak'ah, has played an active part in inciting the Golan Druze and was evidently also involved in this transfer of money.

[Begin Ravya recording] Syrian support for the Druze is nothing new, nor is it limited only to the funneling of funds. Thus, the Syrian authorities have been organizing solidarity demonstrations with the Golan Druze across the border in Al-Qunaytirah. The more vociferous expression of Syrian support has been provided by Damascus radio--and, incidentally, also by the terrorists' radio station--instigating against Israel and calling for opposition to it in their broadcasts.

The funds for the [Golan] Druze began to be transferred by Syria a few months after the Druze first expressed opposition to accepting Israeli identification cards last year. The money is passed on in two methods: the first involves informing a Druze leader on the Golan--such as, for example, a member of the Kanj clan--that he can cut a deal by a handshake and that the one supposed to be the recipient will draw what is due him in the Arab Bank in Amman. The other alternative is by giving a check, drawn from the same bank in Amman.

The second method for transferring money is a bit more limited, and involves bringing the money in through the Jordan River bridges in legally permissible sums, which ultimately find their way to the Golan.

The sums involved are most probably not huge, and probably serve primarily to sustain the Druze who oppose Israel. We should point out that the transfer of funds through the Jordan River bridges has been cut somewhat following the attempt to curb the influx of PLO-originated funds from entering Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

PLO supporters in those areas are also involved in contacts with the Druze. Thus, it has become known that Bassam ash-Shak'ah conferred, in the course of meetings organized by Rakah, with several members of the Kanj family who have been under administrative detention since the Golan Druze strike first began. At least one family member, Sulaymen Kanj, has visited Nabulus--and consequently ash-Shak'ah--under the pretext of needing medical treatment. The ousted mayor is thus charged with playing a role in inciting the Golan Druze and was probably also involved in the transfer of funds. [End recording]

Druze Deny Receiving Aid

TA031010 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 May 82 p 3

[Report from the North by Shim'on Weiss]

[Text] The security and police forces have recently tightened the checks and control at the roadblocks located on the access roads to the Druze villages in the northern Golan Heights in order to prevent the entry of cars which do not have Israeli plates or whose drivers refuse to receive Israeli licenses as stipulated by the law.

This extra control by the authorities cause fury among the Druze.

Notables from the Golan villages and the leaders of the Committee for Solidarity with the Golan Druze announced yesterday that there is no foundation to the report according to which the Golan Druze receive aid from Syria and the PLO. They noted that they received and are still receiving financial and material aid via the Committee of Solidarity and from various elements in the Druze villages in the Galilee and the Karmel (this aid amounts to tens of thousands of shekels).

The clergies from the Golan villages also denied that boycott was imposed on Shaykh Muhammad (Qadmi) from Majdal Shams due to his contacts with communist circles in Israel and beyond the green line. Yesterday the heads of the anti-Israeli Druze in the villages said that their only representative is Shaykh Salman Tahir, the leader of the Golan community, and that no committee has been set up to represent them in possible negotiations with the authorities. Nevertheless, they said they are prepared to transmit their demands to the government via the Druze leader Shaykh Nur ad-Din Halabi from 'Isfiya who had recently asked for authorization from the Golan Druze to conduct the negotiations between them and the Israeli authorities.

Syria to Supply Electricity, Water

TA301357 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 2

[Report by Menahem Horowitz]

[Excerpt] Syria will soon begin work to supply electricity and water to the Druze Golan villages. Syrian citizens who arrived at the border fence near Majdal Shams yesterday reported that Syria will begin cleaning an old spring

near the village which, until the 6-day war, was one of the central water sources for the Golan Druze. Syrian television aired a report confirming this information.

Near the spring, which is in Syrian territory, there are another two Syrian springs the water of which is pumped in pipes to the Druze villages on the Golan. These pipes were clogged in the last few years, but the Syrians wish to clean them and supply the Druze villages with water. It is not yet clear how, if at all, the Syrians will supply the Druze villages with electricity.

Pro-Israeli Druze Protest

TA250611 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2025 GMT 25 Apr 82

[Text] Qazrin, 25 Apr--Israeli sympathizers on the Golan Heights complained today that the Israeli establishment does not extend to them sufficient defense against the pro-Syrian radicals that harrass them due to their support for Israel.

Salman Abu-Salah, the head of the Druze Zionist circle, today sent telegrams to the prime minister and the interior minister in which he describes the grave conditions of the Israeli sympathizers who are not enjoying the support they deserve, according to him. Abu Salah claimed that the radicals sabotage vehicles and damage property belonging to the pro-Israeli Druze by throwing stones at the vehicles and structures, smashing windshields of vehicles and buildings and causing other grave damage.

Salman Abu Salah claimed that those who incite the Golan Druze, among others, are Syrian citizens who appear near the border daily and with the help of loudspeakers call out nationalist slogans and call on the Druze to continue their resistance to Israel and their harrassment of the Israeli sympathizers. When the Druze return from the daily meeting on the border they demonstratively move toward the center of Majdal Shams and from there they throw stones at the houses of the Israeli sympathizers. Abu Salah noted that the condition on the Golan at the moment is very grave from the point of view of the pro-Israeli Golan and they feel like people living in Syria and not like citizens of the state of Israel who are entitled to be defended by it.

Salman Salah and his friends set out with an emotional call on the government to do everything it can to stop the provocations aimed at Israel's sympathizers since the situation on the Golan Heights has become intolerable in this sphere. This also threatens the lives of the Israeli sympathizers who, without national defense, may also lose their lives in view of the increasing incitement against them on the Golan.

CSO: 4400/258

JORDAN, PLO PROMISE TO AID W. BANK OFFICIALS

Focus on Charity Organizations

TA030954 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 May 82 p 8

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Excerpt] Jordan and the PLO have separately promised to extend economic aid to the workers of the local authorities in Judaea and Samaria that will refuse to cooperate with the civilian administration. It has been learned from Arab sources that the decision of the mayors to cooperate against the civilian administration was preceded by contacts with the Jordanian authorities and the PLO leadership and that these two expressed readiness to aid the workers whose wages will be stopped due to lack of cooperation with the Israeli authorities.

According to these sources the preparations for this are already at their height and focus on voluntary institutions and charity organizations over which the Israeli authorities have no control and whose supervision is very limited.

It has been learned that also foreign institutions permanently active in Judaea and Samaria are prepared now more than ever to aid Arabs in their struggle against the civilian administration.

West Bank Municipal Salaries

TA031953 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 3 May 82

[Excerpt] The salaries of hundreds of Nabulus, Ramallah and al-Birah municipality employees, who did not return to work after the dismissal of the mayors, are being paid from the fund of the national institutions of the Palestinians in the territories and from contributions by the inhabitants. This was learned today by our correspondent Rafiq Halabi when he went to examine how the municipalities are working 1 month and 2 weeks after the dismissal of the mayors.

CSO: 4400/258

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NEW JORDAN-WEST BANK RELIGIOUS GROUP--Jordan has established a new committee to handle religious affairs in Judaea and Samaria alongside the Supreme Muslim Council. More than \$3 million has been allocated to the new committee. This has been learned by our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari. The committee is headed by the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council, Shaykh Sa'd ad-Din al-'Alami, and other members of its are Anwar al-Khatib, Anwar Nusaybah, senior clerics from Nablus and Janin and Jordanian personalities. Jordan's funds are in addition to allocations from the joint Jordan-PLO committee and it is the first large sum of this type intended for the territories.
[Text] [TA220518 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2300 GMT 21 Apr 82]

CSO: 4400/258

OUTLOOK, MORES OF REBELS, REFUGEES STUDIED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German No 14, 2 Apr 82 p 14

[Report by Cheryl Bernard, Edit Schlaffer]

[Text] If it were a movie it would be too trite to be credible. The setting: an ambitious little country, governed by a military dictator with bushy eyebrows who had his predecessor put to death in the early morning hours. The collaborators: a superpower which overruns an obscure and poor little country, and many other countries which outbid one another with cynical interpretations of the probable consequences.

Now send a million refugees across the border and give each of their six top leaders an office in the border town of Peshawar plus a private militia and ample military equipment for each.

Then send a band of UN officials, a string of agents from various security services, a gang of educated English leftists and several delegations of fundamentalist religious zealots. Arm the entire male population and hide virtually the entire female population. Fill the old town with dealers who casually resell refugee goods in the original packages, with drug smugglers who unconcernedly continue to use the Khyber Pass as a route, and with official delegations of foreign diplomats and journalists who get drunk on whisky at 300 marks a bottle in the foreigners' bar of the Khyber Intercontinental.

In such a milieu the usual rules of behavior and logic are quickly turned topsy turvy. At evening parties the director of the Red Crescent, the Saudi Arabian equivalent of the Red Cross, points out to his guests the holes which he has just shot in his Persian rug in a moment of jollity. If you come home late after a night out, your concerned host comes looking for you with his pistol all over Peshawar. Those who are even only remotely connected with politics, move in a ritual of security measures: they change taxis twice on their way to a meeting, have several cover names and disavow old friends.

For visitors it is exciting but for those involved it is serious. In the last month 7 persons were found dead in their hotel rooms. Members of Hekmatiar's fundamentalist rebel party, Hezbe Islami, had cut their heads off and stuck

a note on the torso, and on the note stood: "Communist." Some read: "Maoist." Nobody should say that Hekmatiar is not particular about his work.

People disappear daily. Almost everyone has a relative who was tortured or a friend who is missing: victims, not of the Russians or their Afghan puppet regime, but of the opposition party among the freedom fighters. A French correspondent who has already been living in Pakistan for a long time and has accompanied the Afghan rebels into the interior of the country 7 times, responds to our questions on the "best future government for a liberated Afghanistan," with curt sarcasm. "If the European liberals knew what the social values of the Afghans were like," he says, "they would send all their money to Brezhnev."

They Rage as if They Were in Enemy Territory

Not only outsiders are disillusioned. If you ask Afghan fighters what party they belong to they give expression to their disillusionment often enough in their answers. "Hezbe Islami" they say and then spit ostentatiously on the ground to show their disdain. But without party affiliation no weapons. Without party, no refugee ID card, no tent, no rations.

This predominance of the parties--above all the fundamentalist block supporting Afghanistan's young Khomeyni, Golbuddin Hekmatiar--certainly produces many followers, but no loyal ones. There are also increasing reports coming out of Afghanistan that the autocratic ways of the fundamentalists are resented. According to the reports the followers of Hekmatiar are behaving inside Afghanistan--perhaps for the purpose of showing clearly their rejection of Maoism--not like the proverbial fish in water but rather like victorious army hordes in the land of the enemy. They plunder, steal food from the peasants at gunpoint, abduct and rape the women.

Such accusations do not have to be true at all to have an effect; the suspicion alone, especially of the last mentioned offense, is enough to arouse the anger of the Pashtoon people. In three Afghan provinces party activity has already been prohibited by the local administration. Local patriotism always virulent in a land in which "every priest and every mullah, every tribal leader and every village chieftain regards himself as an independent king" (thus wrote Mir Monshi at the turn of the century) is flourishing again. The rebel parties, however, are not waiting for the withdrawal of the Russians, but are already carrying out their power struggle today.

In a single month in the province of Kandahar 250 people died in the struggles between the parties. And Russian troops have in several cases been able to occupy territory after the rebels had killed each other off.

The invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences are a downright allegorical expression of our times. One could make a film of it as such, preferably by Woody Allen. It would have to be a science-fiction film. The Soviets' landing like UFO's in the midst of a tribal society, among the tents, and camels in the Hindu Kush mountains.

As a result all of the participants show their worst side. The Americans waver between spiteful glee--their adversaries are also finally having trouble with the Third World--and realpolitik: the more troops remain occupied in Afghanistan, and the longer they stay there, the less power the Russians have to use for Poland.

Meanwhile the Afghans are fighting enthusiastically, especially against each other. They want to show their machismo and they pay the price for doing so: the foreign advisor who is supposed to show them the function of the fiercely sought after and urgently needed SAM 7 missile is, for example, angrily sent home; what an affront to suggest that there was any kind of weapon an Afghan could not handle. The trouble is that they are, unfortunately, unable to handle it.

In Europe ethnologists are being hauled out of museums to give long-winded explanation on the evening news on the difference between a Pashtoon and a Tajik. Frenchmen tired of civilization, blasé central European leftists and disoriented Afghan student grantees of widely different political coloring find the whole thing picturesque and moving and arrive on the SAS student flights. Even the Stalinists among them succeed in finding confirmation of their position in the things that are happening.

The journalists enjoy themselves the most. First the Afghans are so telegenic, even in the mud of the refugee camps. Secondly, the Afghan men have no objection if you want to put on a turban and have your picture taken next to them. Their leaders have understanding for modern mass media and even put on battles for foreign TV teams who are in a hurry and cannot wait until the Russians offer a weak point for attack. Gilani helpfully sent a troop out to provoke the Russians for French television. There were 14 dead and marvelous pictures.

Things that give journalists a pleasant shudder get on the nerves of UN officials and the refugee aid organizations very quickly: the unspoiled warrior manhood of the Afghans. A UN water supply project had to be given up after the leaders of distant refugee settlements told all the construction workers they would be shot instantly if they did not immediately divert the pipeline to their camp.

Two Pakistani doctors, summoned into a tent by a 75-year-old widow to her unconscious daughter, were shot dead by a group of men who were called in, together with the two women; if strange men are alone in a tent with two women there can be only one single explanation when all is said and done.

Those who want to work in the camps and would like to offer assistance and support immediately sink into a morass of many sided power struggles, rivalries and irrational demands. The parties use the camp as a base for recruiting and intimidation.

The Pakistanis are glad to have the refugees, triple their number in official data, and see them welcome trump cards for their claim that their land is no longer a backward military dictatorship but a central bulwark against

communism. They fear the Afghans, however, too and suspect them sometimes of having found an especially clever method for occupying the long disputed border territory: wolves in sheep's clothing.

Afghans Are Unchangeable

Secretly the Pakistanis would be very glad to get rid of these "Muslim brothers" who circulate throughout the most unsettled region of Pakistan heavily laden with weapons, take away jobs, cost money, deforest whole stretches of land and are not for one second thankful. What would be a good compromise solution for the withdrawal of the Russian troops, we ask the press spokesman of the Pakistani refugee administration. With a controlled smile he spoke for 3 hours on the duties of the Islamic brotherhood and on the sincere love with which the population receives its suffering neighbors, then his nerves give out. "As far as I am concerned they should make Elizabeth Taylor the queen of Afghanistan," he hisses. "The main thing is they should all disappear soon.

In the camps the traditional leaders have reasserted themselves, the mullahs, khans and maliks. There is no way to contradict their decisions. "I'll tell you how we set up the schools," sighs the UN official. "We come into the camp, the council is assembled. Schools are important--we say--your children are sitting around in the tents and in the dust and learning nothing, we would like to build a school for you. Do you want a school? Most of them say, 'Yes!' Then we say we will put up a separate tent for it and employ only women teachers for it, do you also want a girls' school? And just as enthusiastically the men shout, 'No!'" Then the fight over the subjects starts. The refugees want their sons in the school only long enough to recite the Koran from beginning to end. The parties employ their own teachers and print their own schoolbooks. The reading text for the first graders is, "And the mother said to her child: 'You too my child will shed your blood for our great religion and our great fatherland.'"

Pressed by the UN to give up this premature preparation for a martyr's death, the Pakistani government had new readers printed for the refugee children. The text: "This is an airplane. This is a good airplane. This is an Islamic airplane."

Besieged on all sides, the Afghans close their minds more and more to every kind of change. Their dependence on the traditional leaders is undiminished, the clinging tightly to the old way of life more and more rigid. The defensive posture is elevated to the point of arrogance. "There is nothing sadder than the sight of the French teams of doctors who come here voluntarily," a member of the German embassy tells us, not without a hint of spiteful glee. "Full of enthusiasm, they come out of the airplane. And then it starts. They are received haughtily, the unbelievers, the foreigners. Naturally they don't want any payment but they did not expect to be charged rent for the use of the rooms in the clinic. Their arrival in the refugee camps is a memorable sight. In front the proud mujahedin with their kalashnikoffs smartly on their shoulders. Behind them the group of doctors panting under the baggage, the supplies and the boxes of medicine. None lift a finger to help them. Carrying any burden is beneath the dignity of a Pashtoon."

The belated penance for colonial sins may also offer comical aspects. The Afghans from the cities who have fled and stay in Pakistan to help their countrymen find it less amusing. Latifa studied in Poland and then lived in Kabul and is now working in a camp with 30,000 people. While we are visiting her clinic, she is called to visit a sick woman in a tent. The young woman has been in a coma for three days. Latifa examines her in the presence of 15 male relatives and then calls an ambulance. She reckons her chances of survival as almost zero. Why was the woman doctor not called sooner? "Because these people come from the mountains and have brought their way of thinking with them. The cost of a doctor's visit does not pay in the case of a woman and besides they have grown accustomed to having their women die young. Since the clinic is here and the medicine is free, the men come enthusiastically for every little cramp. Many women are not allowed to come at all or, if they are, only when it is a matter of life and death."

The doctor of another camp, a surgeon from Kabul, expands on this report. "I thought I would be treating wounded freedom fighters here." Instead he has the consequences of another kind of fighting to deal with. "I hardly dare to look when women come for examination. Broken arms, skull fractures, bruises, one would think they had been drawn into the war. And always a mother-in-law present to prevent the woman from complaining to me. All of them have just tripped over a tentrope." Discussions with the husbands bring little enlightenment. "Then they say they are fighting against the Russians because they wanted to tell them what to do, and what they do with their wives is their business. Am I not a Muslim that I don't know that? Am I really a Communist too?" The hope of working towards enlightenment by slow degrees was given up by the surgeon after a year and a half in the camp. "Afghans are unchangeable," he says only more unenthusiastically.

In any case the leaders of the Afghan resistance give cause for resignation. After lengthy disputes the six most important parties have formed themselves into two blocks led by Gilani and Hekmatiar. We meet Gilani in his villa in Peshawar. From his frequent visits to the United States he wears Italian designer shoes and holds forth nonchalantly on the backwardness of his people; in Peshawar he is a fundamentalist and cannot name a single Western thinker who has influenced him. ("I devote myself exclusively to Islamic studies.") The great land owner who believes he sees in Islam a prohibition against any kind of land reform, takes pains in Pakistan to get away from his image of being too westernized; one dogmatic statement follows the other.

He describes himself as "fearless" since he knows that he will enter paradise instantly if he should be killed in a war for freedom. In answer to the question what problems the currently existing Islamic culture has, he replies, "None." In answer to follow-up questions he is more precise: "It is perfect and all-embracing." On the question of education he cites a saying of the Prophet Mohammed according to which education is so important that children should be sent to China if necessary to get an education. With this he creates panic among his advisors. Long consultations follow and finally the urgent explanation comes that the "Holy Prophet" only used China as a symbol for a great distance and did not mean Communist China of today.

Towards the end of the interview Gilani thaws somewhat. He avoids answers to all questions concerning Iran and Khomeyini, to be sure. ("Please understand that is too dangerous for us.") But this much he can tell us: if these "fanatics surrounding Golbuddin" come to power it could become even bloodier in Afghanistan than in Iran.

His thus apostrophized rival, Golbuddin Hekmatiar, does not live in a villa, but in a military stronghold, autonomous and fortified like a castle in the middle ages. Behind the high walls there is a training center, a mosque, a prison, living quarters for soldiers and offices for the staff. Golbuddin only leaves this headquarters with an escort, a 25-man-strong bodyguard. This private militia parades through the roads of Pakistan unhindered. The government not only tolerates its activities it supports them as well. The same goes for Saudi Arabia whose money and weapons are granted almost exclusively to the Hezbe-Islami Party. Only with an effort can one recognize in the slim young man who is sitting across from us in the office of his headquarters the personality which has terrorized half of Peshawar. He is called "engineer" but explains modestly without being asked that he only really studied four semesters. His speech is rich in metaphors but also in the obligatory formulas. He does not say "the Europeans" but "our brothers in Europe." The Afghans will be victorious "as surely as at the end of the night the sun will rise." Enshallah, he adds quickly in order not to tempt fate. He answers embarrassing questions quietly and calmly also often quite inventively. He will not admit the 250 who died in Kandahar between his group and its rivals; those were only "quarrels between individuals." Moreover there are "no two power blocks"--his is the only one.

Also the brutal treatment of war prisoners by the rebels which was reported by the foreign press is unknown to him, on that he has an original version to report. The Russians themselves find out where their prisoners are being held and then bombard the whole area until they are sure that none of their people are still alive. They do that "because it is a disgrace for a superpower when their people are taken prisoner by a poor small country. They would rather kill their own soldiers."

He Knows Nothing of Murders

With regard to the continuation of the conflict, Golbuddin appears optimistic. Before this year is out, he says, the Afghans will defeat the Soviets militarily. The remainder that he already prophesied that on U.S. television a year ago does not irritate him. "I know," he says calmly, "our European brothers do not believe that we can defeat the Russians." The question as to how it happens that he has such a bad reputation if he truly knows nothing of murders, beheadings, unpopularity in the interior and struggles between power blocks, also does not cause Hektiar embarrassment. He knows, "There is much propaganda against our party. In the West the conviction is slowly spreading that Islam is even more dangerous than Communism." In this idea he recognizes "the long hand of Zionism. After all the Jews are behind the mass media, not only in the United States."

How will this conflict between a superpower and a small country come out? The longer one thinks about it, the less one knows which outcome is to be desired for the Afghans. A Russian occupation for many years with gradual integration following the example of the Islamic provinces of Soviet Central Asia? A continuing war with unequal means? A retreat by the Russians with ensuing civil war between the Afghan parties?

A consolidation of traditional authority and local leaders feeling strengthened in their social rigidity?

"The Russians have brought about what our own central government never succeeded in doing," opened hopefully one member of a small leftwing Afghan faction. "The common enemy, the presence of our most backward segment of the population in more progressive Pakistan, all of that will release new political forces and make our people more open to the world."

For the sake of the Afghans it is to be hoped that he is right. Enshallah.

9827
CSO: 4620/37

LIBRARY SHORTCOMINGS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Mar 82 p 9

[Article by M. Ghobrini: "Kouba--A Library Cramped for Space"]

[Text] As is the case with the other libraries in the wilaya of Algiers, the communal library of Kouba is among the most highly specialized. Being the only library in a commune that has more than 100,000 inhabitants, most of them young--and thus in quest of knowledge and instruction--this library no longer meets the norms of a library in the true sense of the word. Because of its position as a nerve-center, since it is situated in the chief town of the commune, it suffers from the lack of material and human resources. In addition, its infrastructure is far from meeting the population's ever-increasing demand for education.

"Inherited from the colonial period, confided Mr Amokrane, vice chairman of the commune's education and culture committee, the children of colonials who, in smaller numbers, benefited very comfortably from its socioeducational structure and its leisure activities. [as published]

"Formerly, it is true, it served only the privileged--that is, the dominant minority. But after independence, this situation that had lasted only too long was brought to an end. Furthermore, from the first days the library's doors were open to everyone, without exception."

A Very Small and Ill-Equipped Library

The fact is that the Kouba Library, which is one of the oldest libraries in our country, finds itself, like most of them, in an extremely critical situation. Up to the present, the various SOS's sent out to the official bodies concerned in order to obtain some immediate relief for this situation have met with no response. The major handicap is still scientific books, which are absent from the shelves.

The single room, which serves as both library and lecture hall, even an exhibit room on the occasion of local cultural events, no longer manages to carry out fully the role that has devolved to it.

The arrangements made on the inside to alleviate its insufficiencies remain temporary solutions. "We have on several occasions fitted out another room in the APC," Mr Amokrane remarked to us, "and even with all the constraints and difficulties caused by such displacement, the problem always remains where it started."

During our visit we had indeed noted this state of affairs, the consequences of which affect, in the last analysis, the young people who only want to improve their minds.

"The doors are open to all readers," the librarian, Mme Kedah, told us; "but in view of the fact that the reading room can accomodate only 56 readers at a time, we are unfortunately obliged to accept only the most urgent ones--that is, those who are preparing for examinations.

"This distinction, which is the result of lack of space," she continued, "disheartens me. It is very painful for me to see children of any age go to so much trouble to finally get to the library and then be refused access because there are no seats available. We sometimes receive as many as 150 readers per day, especially during the periods before examinations or during school vacation."

Of course, in support of this information gathered on the spot, we noted this state of affairs--i.e., that most of the readers present are future diploma-
earners, preparing either as free agents or as students enrolled in school. They lack written materials, especially scientific books in the national language. Apart from literary works, which are far from the quantity in which the readers demand them, since in certain cases they are not lent to take out, scientific books can be counted on one's fingers. How many times has a book on physics or math or natural sciences passed from one table to another, exchanged by the readers so that they can work!

The young people encountered on the spot gave us their impressions of this library. For one young student studying for a school-leaving diploma in science, "the place and the atmosphere are good. It is easy to work, and we are not disturbed. What we want is to have all the books we need. Especially for me and my two friends here--we are free-agent diploma candidates, and this library is the only place where we can get written materials and information."

A girl student from the Hassiba Ben Bouali lycee told us that she has been coming to the library "for 4 years now," and that she is very interested in Arabic literature, in which the library, thank God, has a sizable collection of books. "Now that I am preparing for the diploma in science," she says, "I always like to come to this library, but I find that the only book on science is not sufficient."

Another girl remarked that "the librarian is very nice, she does everything possible to help us, but the lack of books, which my friend over there finished by telling you, makes us lose a lot of time.

Absence of Scientific Books

Thus, if the shelves are full of old books that are outmoded, since no one buys them anymore, if a reader looks for a dictionary or an encyclopedia and does not find what he is looking for, there is reason to be disturbed and to ask questions about the informative role that should characterize a library. While maps, slides, films, records, and sessions to introduce one to bodily and artistic expression are advantageous things that characterize the modern library, the fact remains that many things can be achieved with the means available. The APC has a big lecture hall, well fitted-out and comfortable, that can be used for other activities so as to diversify the library's role. Even though the library tends to specialize in the organization of lecture series that fall within the framework of the APC's cultural activities and as a rehearsal room for young amateur theater groups, it can also serve, from time to time, as a hall for showing films of an educational character. If such events do come about, they will be useful especially to young schoolchildren on Monday and Thursday afternoons when they do not have classes. Furthermore, the commune, which has only two theaters, can use the library as another means of educational entertainment.

The commune of Kouba, where the highest density of school-age children of the wilaya of Algiers is concentrated, is lacking in socioeducational structure in relation to the population. Quite a bit of scope is granted to this sector in the coming plans, to be sure, but for the time being, this problem remains one of the most crucial that the commune encounters.

For 23 primary schools, 6 middle schools, 3 lycees, 1 ITTPB [expansion unknown], 1 youth center and a teacher-training college, this commune has only 1 library that is grappling with a dilapidated internal and external structure.

56 Seats for 150 Readers

"The books exist," Mr Amokrane remarked; "you need only to look at the shelves to see that; but more than half are novels inherited from the colonial period. We receive promises of books every day," he continued, "but concretely, apart from the Ministry of Information, which has given us the quota promised, the others do not always materialize."

"There are difficulties, of course," he admitted, "and they did not come about just yesterday. I do not at all want to say that the first representatives of this elected body are responsible, nor do I wish to discredit the efforts they have made for the proper functioning of this library; I only want you to know that everything necessary has been done at our level, and that if there has been no result, it is beyond our capacities."

In the area of lending too, the reader is not convenience; of the library's approximately 8,000 books, more than half can be lent out. In 1981, for example, 2,267 readers took books out on loan. "If each reader takes out just two books," the librarian told us, "we would find that more than half the books are out." In the same year, 1981, 11,519 readers came to the library; therefore the quantity of books available for ensuring the minimum rotation is

clearly insufficient. On the want list are 4,155 books in French, 617 journals in various disciplines in the national language, and some 2,500 works in Arabic, including novels and school books, plus a quantity of children's books.

Among the books requested by the young people who frequent the library, we note in particular all those that deal with the various national achievements such as the Trans-Saharan, telecommunications, the dams, the economy and industry in our country. For their leisure reading, the young people are interested in books on the cinema, aviation, automobiles, the sea and nature, not to forget sport, which is in great demand. In the technical area, the readers want to find books dealing with computers, radar, cosmology and underwater research.

Construction of a Multipurpose Hall

After reviewing all the problems that this library faces daily and the difficulties that the readers and the officials of the commune encounter in finding solutions appropriate to the situation, and in the light of what has been said on the role that the library should play in the education and training of the masses, solutions should be envisioned for coping with its insufficiencies.

The efforts that the local elected officials ceaselessly make to get things under better control are considerable. It is with this constant concern in mind that Mr Amokrane told us about the projects that the commune is looking toward in the short term in its organization program. Thus there is planned, within the framework of the development of the Anassers plateau, the construction of a library with installations appropriate to modern structures. Likewise it is planned, within the same urban-modernization plan, to build a cultural center that will take care of all the difficulties that the commune encounters in the area of public reading.

These two cultural buildings that are programmed for the commune and to which the local bodies assign the most particular importance will be, in the last analysis, the only solution that will be received by the commune's population with joy. While the carrying-out of these projects--which, on the whole, are promising--is awaited, we hope that there will be fruitful contacts among the officials concerned to remedy the problem of scientific books promptly, especially for these young people who have no sources of information other than this library.

11267
CSO: 4519/166

IRAN SEEKS INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ

LD061012 Tehran IRNA in English 0900 GMT 6 May 82

[Text] Tehran, 5 May (IRNA)--Iran will call on international organisations to condemn Baghdad's "premeditated" downing of an Algerian executive jet near the Iran-Turkey border Monday which killed the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben Yahia, and another thirteen abroad.

The international organisations slated to receive copies of an official memorandum of the Iranian government include the Human Rights Committee of the International Red Cross, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and the IATA (International Air Transport Association).

In foreign ministry today, officials sharply condemned the Baghdad regime for the attack against the Algerian plane and described the action as a crime and a blatant violation of the international convention which had been approved in Montreal in 1971 and of which Iraq is a signatory. The Undersecretaries of the Foreign Ministry Kazempur-Ardabili and Mirmehdi, said the people who commit such criminal acts are known as "international criminals" who should be tried and punished.

The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ministry for Legal Affairs, Mirmehdi, said here today that according to the international convention even the intention by any government of attacking passenger planes would be punishable according to Section II of Paragraph A under Article One of the convention. He said on the strength of all available documents, the attack against the craft had been a premeditated plot by the ruling regime in Iraq which aggravated the original offense. He noted that the crime had vast dimensions in that it had been committed against a person whose mission it was to mediate between Iran and Iraq with the goal of bringing the imposed war to its end. He described the martyred minister as having a brilliant record of struggle against foreign domination.

CSO: 4600/454

IRANIAN OFFICIAL: 'NO DOUBT' ALGERIAN PLANE DOWNED BY IRAQIS

LD061018 Tehran IRNA in English 0922 GMT 6 May 82

[Text] Urumiyeh, 6 May (IRNA)--Colonel Bahman Forqani, head of the inquiry mission dispatched to the scene of the crash of the Algerian plane said here Wednesday that there was no doubt that the Algerian plane had been shot down by the Iraqi missiles. He told IRNA that some part of the Iraqi missiles and also the tail of the plane, with exploded Iraqi missiles in it, had been found five kilometers away from the fuselage of the plane proving that it had been attacked by the Iraqi missiles. Referring to the radar recorded tapes [as received] Colonel Forqani said that the Iraqi fighters had flown with an angle of 90 degrees with the Algerian plane and that at the moment the Algerian plane was approaching toward the Iranian border, they hit it. The Iranian radar warned the Algerian plane to change direction toward Ankara, Turkey, the colonel added noting that the pilot of the Algerian plane wasted a few minutes by starting to argue. Finally, he accepted to change direction towards Ankara, by making a 180-degree turn to the left but when he was in 120 degrees, the Iraqi fighters hit it with missiles, Forqani added.

On the type of the Iraqi missiles, the colonel said that some words written in Russian could be seen on the missiles. But, he added, the result of the investigations on the type of the missiles would be announced later.

CSO: 4600/454

MAJLIS OFFICIAL ON ATTACK AGAINST ALGERIAN PLANE

LD052126 Tehran IRNA in English 1951 GMT 5 May 82

[Text] Abadan, 5 May (IRNA)--A high-ranking government official said here today that the downing of an Algerian plane by the Baghdad regime near the Iranian-Turkish border Monday was a vivid proof of the falsehood of Saddam Husayn's claim of having "pan-Arab aspirations."

Hojat ol-Eslam Yazdi, vice speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), who [was] referring to the martyrdom of Algerian Foreign Minister Ben Yahya with thirteen others, said that by its frequent bombing of hospitals, schools and residential areas in the southern and western provinces the ruling regime in Baghdad had acted in blatant violation of all international laws, and conventions of war. He described the attack against the Algerian executive jet by the Iraqi fighters as a preconceived scheme by "plotters, and U.S. mercenaries." "The end of (?Saddam Husayn's) life is near," said he, "whatever crime he may commit is not likely to save him from his doomed death." The Hojat ol-Eslam is in Abadan visiting the battlefronts.

CSO: 4600/454

SYRIAN ENVOY CONDEMNED IRAQI ATTACK ON BEN YAHIA

LD062120 Tehran IRNA in English 1920 GMT 6 May 82

[Text] Tehran, 6 May (IRNA)--The Syrian Ambassador to Iran, Ibrahim Yunis, categorically condemned Iraq's air piracy culminating in the crash of the plane and martyrdom of the Algerian foreign minister and his entourage on Monday night. Issuing a statement he said that the objective of this imperialist plot was to separate Iran from the steadfastness front and halt this country's struggles against imperialism and Zionism.

He added that his plot was aimed to create suspicion between Iran and Algeria, at a time when coordination and strategic unity between Iran and the countries of the steadfastness front had been established and when Iran posed a serious threat to the Zionist regime.

The Syrian ambassador said that the Algerian Foreign Minister, Ben Yahia was to continue important negotiations which had been conducted by the foreign ministers of Syria and the Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Pointing to Iraq's culpability in this event, Ibrahim Yunis said that taped conversations from Tabriz control tower proved that two Iraqi planes were chasing the Algerian foreign minister's plane and eyewitnesses testified to this. He also pointed out that all airports in the region and the world news agencies were fully aware of the trip of the Algerian foreign minister to Tehran, and therefore Iraq would have no difficulty in identifying the plane.

In conclusion, Yunis praised the struggles of Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia and condemned Iraqi aggression against the Algerian mission.

The Syrian ambassador to Iran upon hearing the news, went to the crash area along with a mission dispatched by officials and observed closely the evidence of this incident.

CSO: 4600/454

SINAI OPPONENTS CLAIM GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT

TA010624 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Apr 82 p 2

[Report by Israel Amrani]

[Text] Official government bodies on numerous occasions helped the movement to stop the withdrawal in Sinai with information and contacts, according to a movement source, to exploit the immense propaganda value inherent in the anti-withdrawal cause.

Among the bodies helping were the prime minister's office and the foreign ministry, the source claimed; they directed movement activists in their fund-raising drive three months ago, and provided them, until shortly before the withdrawal, with names and addresses of people in the United States who could aid them in contacts with the U.S. news media.

The purpose of the help, which the movement could not get otherwise because of its extremist image was apparently to show that Israel was indeed sacrificing a great deal for peace.

Yehi'el Qadishay, an aide to Prime Minister Menahem Begin, last night denied the allegation, calling it "pure rubbish."

Activists neither sought nor expected the help, according to the source. Officials, though they were supposedly acting privately and "under the table," were clearly contacting activists under orders from above, he said.

Some of the contacts suggested were semi-official or "establishment" organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the Bnai Brith Anti-Defamation League in the United States. The source said that ADL officials, while emphasizing differences in ideology and political identification, maintained they would be content if "you make a lot of noise about the withdrawal to show the world Israel is giving up something."

Despite the government's apparent attempts to limit news coverage of Yamit's last tumultuous days, the electronic media generally enjoyed good relations with the government.

A sophisticated communications centre including dish antennae for satellite transmission, was set up in Yamit. This would have been impossible without

electricity and telephone lines. Foreign newsmen reportedly enjoyed unlimited use of telephone lines from deserted homes in the town, although the communications ministry usually disconnects telephones when residents move.

Israel television reporter Yig'al Goren charged last weekend that government bodies allowed activists to move into houses, resumed their supply of electricity and provided entry and exit passes quite generously. He added that Brig Gen Uri Bar-on, an aide to Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon, helped settlers and activists at every step.

Bar-on retorted last night that it was "idiotic" to believe he had encouraged members of the anti-withdrawal movement to resist eviction. He explained that meetings with leaders of the anti-withdrawal movement had been designed to calm them. Goren's claims were "lies and falsehoods," he said.

Asked how the movement knew when the evacuation would begin, Bar-on said Sharon had promised its leaders to let them know--and kept his word.

Another possible reason for official cooperation with the anti-withdrawal movement could have been the government's desire to be prepared in case it decided to delay the withdrawal.

A movement delegation, including Mks Hayim Druckman and Yuval Ne'eman, which flew to New York about three months ago for a three-week visit, worked under the assumption that Begin cared a great deal about Diaspora Jewry. Its extensive lobbying in Jewish communities throughout the United States was intended in part to build support in case the government called off the withdrawal, as it almost did early last week.

CSO: 4400/257

ISRAEL

'YEDI'OT' COMMENTS ON ISRAELI ISOLATION

TA301632 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 2

[Commentary by Erol Guiney: "Kimche: Members of the Foreign Service are Soldiers in the Struggle Against Our Political Isolation"]

[Text] The shocking resolution condemning Israel as a "country that is not peace-loving" passed by the UN General Assembly precisely at a time when Israel had evacuated the Sinai for the sake of peace reinforces the remarks recently made to us by the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, David Kimche:

"To date Israel's constant problem has been to ask itself if and when war would break out and how to ready itself for it. It is clear that this occupation has not ended, but after the peace with Egypt the struggle with the Arabs has been diverted to another field: the international arena. Our primary problem now is how to foil the Arabs' attempts to isolate Israel and negate its legal status. In this struggle the foreign ministry plays the role of the general headquarters. Israel's embassies and diplomats have the status of soldiers. In certain cases they take upon themselves all the dangers to which genuine soldiers are exposed, as was proved by what happened recently to one of our diplomats in Paris. This is the new situation and it is necessary to understand it well."

David Kimche is a relatively "new face" in the foreign ministry. He came there after many years of work in the Mosad. However, we gain the impression that the change has been made easily by him and he feels "at home" in his new post. He even gives the impression of enjoying his work, although it is hard labor.

The evening he received me for a talk in his home, he had just completed an exhaustive round of talks in Jerusalem and Cairo about the problem of the border demarcation in the Tabah region, which, on the surface, appeared to be insoluble. While waving his pencil in his hand he tried to explain to me why it was so difficult to reach any agreement on the question of sovereignty over this 1,020-meter long stretch of coast.

In the meantime, however, additional files had piled up on his table: He was preparing for his trip to Paris, at the head of a large interministry delegation from Israel, for important talks in the framework of the Joint French-Israeli Economic Committee.

"This will be the committee's first meeting in 11 years, and now that Mr Mitterrand has given the green light we expect to find ways to develop relations between us, not only in the field of commerce, but also in the fields of finance, industry, technology and scientific cooperation and perhaps even cooperation in Africa. This is a strange change," he said with a smile.

However, the main issue about which Kimche wanted to talk that evening was the new battle with the Arabs, in which we are involved, and the mission laid upon Israeli diplomats in this new era.

"It is obvious," he said to me, "that the situation appears to be paradoxical: Here we are making such a great sacrifice for peace, a sacrifice which is great from any viewpoint--strategic, economic and psychological--and that very same day we face a resolution by a special UN Assembly condemning Israel as a country that does not want peace. And the United States has been forced to use a threat about cutting down its contribution to the United Nations in order to get the special assembly not to recommend our suspension from the [line dropped in original] Arabs are trying to isolate us anywhere they can and in any possible forum, with the goal of creating around Israel a hostile atmosphere which, in the long term, could have very grave results.

"In this struggle the Arabs have more cards in their hands than they have in a war. In the military field Israel enjoys a qualitative superiority in terms of armed forces and it keeps the balance of power very well, despite the quantitative superiority of our enemies. Because Egypt has left the cycle of military hostility for the foreseeable future, from this aspect the situation has become even better.

"But in the political sphere, the Arabs have two superior factors over us, to which we have no immediate reply: Their great numbers and their great wealth."

"The importance of the numerical factor is obvious: Whatever the differences of opinion among the Arab countries, they unite whenever there is a diplomatic attack against Israel, and their number--with the addition of their allies--is impressive.

"The same thing applies to their material wealth, although OPEC is now in a somewhat difficult position and the 'oil weapon' appears less threatening than in the past. At any rate, the odds against us are enormous and if we take this into account, I must say that we have had appreciable success."

This springs from the fact that the foreign ministry, according to Kimche, has superb professional forces and devoted diplomats who work as a coordinated team. In the short period of its existence, Israel has succeeded in building up a diplomatic corps of which countries with a much longer tradition could be proud.

The achievements, in Kimche's opinion, originate also in the way in which Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir fulfills his role. He has enormous work strength, reads cables and reports from our embassies, listens to all the ideas expressed to him and thus creates a strong work motivation. He is a warm-hearted man and also knows how to establish good human relations with foreign diplomats and other foreign ministers with whom he meets at home and abroad.

However, it is obvious, Kimche continued, that for the purpose of the fight against the Arab attempt to isolate Israel, a good foreign ministry is not sufficient. The fight must be conducted on many fronts, and the one now being emphasized is the economic front. The more economic ties Israel has with more countries, the more difficult it will be for our enemies to isolate us. The foreign ministry has now become very much aware of the importance of this front. Our ambassadors now understand that in order to be a good ambassador, it is also necessary to know how to sell stockings.

As Kimche sees it, the developments of our economic and other relations with African countries is both compensation for the absence of diplomatic relations and a first step toward their renewal. He thinks that in this field we have made great progress. Although we must aim at the renewal of diplomatic relations as soon as possible, we must not delude ourselves about the ways and means the Arabs are using to prevent this, and to date they have succeeded.

It is very possible that peace with Egypt will not rapidly rectify this situation. Therefore, we must develop close ties with African countries, so that a renewal of diplomatic relations will fall into our hands like ripe fruit in the end.

In my personal estimation, the statements by the director general of the foreign ministry require a series of comments.

--There is no doubt that Yitzhaq Shamir and David Kimche have succeeded in creating a better atmosphere in the foreign ministry than there was in the past, when many skilled people felt frustrated for a long time. Amazingly enough, this happened despite the fact that several senior diplomats disagree with at least some of the government's policy lines, but as loyal government officials they carry out their instructions. And, since they are listened to and their advice is often taken into account, they have strong motivation. It is true that there are rifts with the employees' committee because of several political appointments, but if the number of these appointments does not increase, it may be expected that the atmosphere will remain good and the ministry will be able to play its role as is expected of it, in this period of a diplomatic offensive against Israel.

--On the other hand, neither is there any doubt that the diplomatic offensive against us is being helped by certain of Israel's policy lines--especially in the territories--that do not originate in the foreign ministry. If it is true that our most important mission in the foreseeable future is to foil the Arabs' attempt to isolate Israel, then it is essential that these considerations should be taken into account by those in the ministry of defense

and the prime minister's office who lay down these policy lines. There is an impression that they do not always do so....

--In democratic countries public opinion is very important. The Sinai evacuation, with all the drama it involved, illustrated to the public the full extent of the sacrifice Israel made for peace. The foreign ministers of the EEC have even now praised the evacuation decision as a step toward making peace in our area.

However, there is a feeling that there is a trend in the government especially among some of its members, to try to obtain the support of Tehiya. This is pushing them into making statements and doing things that could cause us to lose at least some of the understanding and sympathy the Sinai evacuation brought us among Western political circles and Western public opinion. It is obvious that such a development could only help the attempts to isolate Israel. What can and must be expected from the government is that it take into account not only the domestic factor, but also the external ones. This is because we are entering a new stage of diplomatic activity.

--It is superfluous to add that public opinion in Western democracies is at least partly influenced by the reports by the Western foreign correspondents stationed in Israel, in temporary or permanent positions. The least that must be said is that the tactics taken recently by the defense ministry in the territories and its behavior toward the foreign correspondents has not exactly helped Israel.

--This does not mean that Defense Minister Sharon has not played an important role in convincing the Egyptians to keep their commitments in the field of normalization of relations. From contacts with Egyptians here and in Cairo one gains the impression that deliberations with Sharon have led them to a general conclusion that if peace is too chilly--for example, if they recall their ambassadors from Israel in order to make the renewal of their relations with Arab countries easier--this could begin a process that would in the end lead to war. It is clear that they are not interested in taking this risk.

There are other reasons guaranteeing, for the moment at least, the continuation of normal relations with Egypt. Among these, the following may also be enumerated:

--Egypt does not want to take the risk of jeopardizing its special relations with the United States.

--It wants to maintain its image as a great country that honors its written commitments--besides of course, fact that it has very good reasons to refrain from doing so.

--The Egyptians have learned to live without the Arab world and they are now convinced that the Arab world needs them more than they need it.

--Therefore, despite the Arab campaign for the isolation of Israel, it is not impossible that the not-too-distant future we will be lucky enough to see an Israeli embassy in Cairo with the embassies of several Arab countries beside it. When we think of this, there is no doubt that it will be a great development of importance.

'HA'ARETZ' ON POST-APRIL SITUATION

TA301534 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 13

[Commentary by A. Schweitzer: "After 25 April"]

[Text] Unless some extraordinary events take place in other parts of the world to attract the attention of those who arrange global order, there should not be much doubt over the subject that will be discussed by the international political community during the remaining part of the year: The continued implementation, or the finding of an alternative, to the Camp David accords. This is what Messrs Begin, Mubarak and Haig say and this is what the chorus of commentators in many countries throughout the world say, too. But even at this early stage it looks as though no points of agreement have been found besides the agenda: What Israel calls the autonomy is a farce as far as the other partners--and onlookers--are concerned with respect to the moves that are to lead to the implementation of the second part of the Camp David accords; and these interpretations have been branded by Israel's leaders as the beginning of the end for this country.

Perhaps the hustle-bustle in anticipation of a confrontation that will expose before all the insoluble contradiction between the positions on autonomy could have been mitigated were it not for the new Israeli tendency to present declarations rather than deeds, or at least to tie the deed to vociferous noise. The fresh illustrations of this are: The cabinet resolution to establish eight future settlements and the draft resolution on legislation intended to outlaw the uprooting of settlements. The Golan law that did not change anything in effect and is also part of the family. In substantial terms, the gap between the parties' position would not have diminished even if the declarations were not made and the determined/angered faces were not seen. Yet somehow this way it is easier to continue to mark time diplomatically, as has been the case in the last 3 years, thus allowing for developments in the field to do their thing.

The impression is therefore that contrary to the traditional Israeli method of creating facts with the minimum of noise, the government will continue to exacerbate the disagreement between itself and the world community. True, this disagreement deals with an issue that is not central either in terms of the region and certainly not insofar as world peace is concerned: The Palestinian issue. However, such is the nature and power of the propaganda and

brainwashing that have been conducted for the past decade and even longer, that they make this disagreement sufficient ground to poison Israel's relations with the world. Still, contrary to the logic according to which sensible people have been conducting their countries' foreign affairs, the Israeli government is doing everything in its power to deepen the rift.

It is not clear if it does so because it hopes to gain an advantage from it domestically (except for profits among marginal groups like Gush Emunim and the likes of it) or if it is paying luxury tax to Mr Begin, who is both addicted to Eretz Yisra'el and also regards arrogant and argumentative words as a preferred tool with which to conduct international relations. But since on the Arab side--and particularly in the Palestinian sector--one can find so-called statesmen shaped in the image of the Israeli prime minister (perhaps one had better say that he, too, was made in their image), one must assume that the deliberations on the implementation of the second part of the Camp David accords will be conducted in high notes and will reach a stalemate faster and more noisily than Israel would need.

In the short term, say until the end of 1982, there is no need for the deadlock to have practical detrimental results (apart from the continued erosion of Israel's standing among nations, while it is being presented as the international troublemaker). Since the Arab world is divided and Iraq is still embroiled in war, there are only slim chances that the Arabs would launch a military campaign against Israel. The United States, too, is busy with various issues the significance of which, as far as it is concerned, are far more extensive than the Middle East issue: The arms race with the Soviet Union, its relations with Europe, its status in the two Americas. So pressures will come, as will the noise; but the way things look right now, no practical conclusions will be drawn from it. In other words, the remaining part of 1982 may become a kind of image of the years that have passed since the Likud assumed power: Insofar as the cabinet--and particularly the prime minister--are concerned, an almost ideal state of affairs.

However, it looks as though the cabinet--and here the cabinet is Mr Begin--sees great dangers in the offing, such as no normal flesh and blood would discern. Otherwise, how is one to comprehend his renewed suggestion--the one attributed to him by the press this week--that a national unity government be established, or to call it by a more practical term, a coalition with the alignment? If there are no great dangers ahead, what would such a coalition give him, when it would only create problems for him in the manning of portfolios that do not seem to be soluble, and will nonetheless force him to rewrite the [Likud] basic guidelines so that they would somehow satisfy the programmatic demands of an equal-size partner. The meager advantage this might have is that there will be no need for the day in and day out motions of nonconfidence submitted to the Knesset. But this, too, is in no way comparable to the headaches its formation will bring the minute serious talk toward this begins.

Mr Begin's blooming as prime minister began the moment he got rid of the ministers (Dayan, Weizman and the like) who were both an ideological outcast and also people of equal, or greater, stature. If he now forms a broad

coalition, he would be bringing the situation to what it was during the years from 1977 to 1980 in addition to creating the need to formulate new basic guidelines. Without these, neither the alignment, nor even the Labor Party alone, would join the cabinet; and let us not forget that these are guidelines that deviate from the convictions and conceptions of the prime minister, the Herut movement and the NRP, the two main cornerstones of the present coalition. All this, to repeat, so that no motions of nonconfidence are submitted, they having so far proved themselves a blunt-edged sword. Regarding Mr Begin's judgment, there are various views, but even his critics attribute to him sufficient common sense to allow him to differentiate between a political deal and its opposite.

Therefore, it would be better to estimate that the cabinet will continue to serve during 1982 in its present constellation, with Agudat Yisra'el and Tami. The 61-member coalition has proved itself to be less shaky than many had thought; at any rate it is disciplined and obedient. It is true that it is unable to face a serious political or military test. For example, if Gush Emunim and the Israeli ayatollahs were clever enough to arouse wide popular opposition to the evacuation of the Yamit district, Mr Begin would have had to choose between implementing the peace treaty and maintaining his government in its present constellation. The same holds true for a full-size international confrontation, at which more than a postponement of 1 or 2 months in the delivery of some aircraft would be at stake.

However, as I have stated above, such questions will probably not be relevant or topical in Israel in the remaining part of 1982. And for the sake of what will be topical, Begin will likely opt to stick to the parliamentary band that enables him to continue to anger the whole world around us against Israel. In short, the world is not likely to change after 25 April, at least not on the face of things.

CSO: 4400/257

POLL INDICATES BEGIN DROPS IN POPULARITY

TA270820 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Apr 82 p 2

[Report by political correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Prime Minister Menahem Begin remains the most popular choice for the premiership, and Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon for the defence portfolio. Labour's Yitzhaq Rabin continues to come second in the premiership stakes, followed by President Yitzhaq Navon and Labour Party Chairman Shim'on Peres.

Both Begin and Sharon are far ahead of their rivals, as is Finance Minister Yoram Aridor. Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, although topping his list, has Labour's Abba Eban breathing down his neck, the only such instance in a poll surveying the public's evaluation of the best choice for the four senior Cabinet posts.

These are the findings of the Jerusalem POST's monthly public opinion poll on the standing of the contestants for the top Cabinet positions. It was conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Institute of Research among a sample of 1,260 adults at the end of March and early in April.

Question: Who is best suited to be prime minister"?

	March-April	Feb.	Jan.	Nov.
Menahem Begin	40.6	41.5	41.5	45.1
Yitzhaq Rabin	11.5	18.1	12.8	11.3
Yitzhaq Navon	7.5	7.7	5.7	6.7
Shim'on Peres	7.4	6.9	7.4	7.9
'Ezer Weizman	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.3
Ari'el Sharon	1.6	1.9	-	-
Others	3.4	3.0	7.9	2.7
Undecided	26.0	19.4	22.7	25.0

Institute director Dr Sara Shemer noted that while Begin has slipped slightly in recent months, he still has 3.5 as many votes as Rabin. When analysing the demographic profile of the supporters of Begin and Peres, Shemer found that Begin still commanded the backing of the tradition-minded proletarians of oriental origin. However, among the Begin voters there were also some white-collar workers and secular-minded persons of Western origin.

Peres enjoyed more support among women, Western communities, older voters and the secular-minded.

Question: "Who is best suited to be defence minister?"

	April-March	Feb.	Jan.	Nov.
Ari'el Sharon	43.2	46.1	41.5	49.6
'Ezer Weizman	12.1	11.1	10.7	9.6
Yitzhaq Rabin	5.4	5.4	5.6	4.6
Hayim Bar-Lev	3.4	3.7	3.7	4.9
Mordekhay Gur	1.5	4.0	3.7	2.6
Refa'el Eytan	-	1.8	1.5	-
Others	4.9	4.8	8.4	3.5
Undecided	29.5	32.1	24.9	25.2

Question: "Who is best suited to be foreign minister?"

	March-April	Feb.	Jan.	Nov.
Yitzhaq Shamir	26.6	32.8	32.3	31.2
Abba Eban	20.6	23.4	20.7	19.1
'Ezer Weizman	4.0	2.0	2.5	2.1
Yitzhaq Rabin	3.3	2.7	2.2	2.6
Hayim Herzog	1.4	2.1	2.1	1.5
Shim'on Peres	1.2	1.2	-	-
Others	5.4	4.3	10.6	6.6
Undecided	37.5	31.5	29.6	36.9

Question: "Who is best suited to be finance minister?"

	March-April	Feb.	Jan.	Nov.
Yoram Aridor	32.4	38.7	36.3	30.4
Yiga'el Hurvitz	7.5	6.4	6.7	6.3
Ya'akov Levinson	3.5	4.1	2.7	3.5
Hayim Ben-Shahar	2.6	4.3	2.3	5.8
Gad Ya'aqobi	1.6	1.1	-	-
Ya'akov Meridor	1.0	-	-	-
Simha Ehrlich	1.0	1.2	1.8	-
Others	3.1	4.5	9.9	5.8
Undecided	47.3	39.7	40.3	48.2

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ISRAEL

POLL SHOWS PUBLIC AGREES WITH SINAI WITHDRAWAL

TA301406 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] The majority of the public thinks that the Sinai evacuation was justified and that the Egyptians will maintain peaceful relations.

These findings emerge from a public opinion poll conducted on 24-26 April for the YEDI'OT AHARONOT editorial board. The poll, which involved 1,197 interviewees constituting a representative sample of the Jewish population, was carried out by the Dahaf Research Institute directed by Dr Mina Tzemah.

Question: Taking into consideration all the factors connected with the Sinai withdrawal--the events surrounding the withdrawal, the fears and the hopes--was the return of Sinai to Egypt justified, in your opinion?

Definitely justified	Justified	Doubtful	Unjustified	Certainly Not
14.5	37.8	17.6	18.5	8.3

There were 3.3 percent who said that they had no opinion one way or the other.

Question: In your opinion, after the completion of the withdrawal will Egypt continue with peaceful relations and normalization with Israel, or will the relations worsen?

Will continue with relations	Worsen relations	No opinion
52.5	38.1	9.4

Question: What marks would you give the government of Israel for its handling of the Sinai evacuation?

Good to very good	Neither good nor bad	Not good to bad	No opinion
38	24	35	3

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ISRAEL

NAHAL TROOPS STILL AT W. BANK OUTPOSTS

TA021244 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 May 82 p 6

[Report by Hayim (Handworker)]

[Text] The defense ministry and the IDF so far have not kept their commitment to return to their Kibbutzim by Independence Day the Nahal troops serving without pay who were diverted to settlement at outposts in Judea and Samaria instead of staying on Kibbutzim.

At the beginning of April the defense minister and the chief of staff met with the heads of the Kibbutz movements about the matter of transferring the Nahal troops serving in Judea and Samaria contrary to the view of the Kibbutz movements which oppose settlement in these areas.

The heads of the Kibbutz movements have learned that a certain extension in the stay of the Nahal troops at the outposts is intended and they are angry as a result. The Secretary of the Kibbutz Movement Alliance, Mr Avraham (Barom), at the end of last week sent a telegram to the defense minister and the chief of staff in which he demanded implementation of the agreement reached at the meeting about the return of the Nahal troops to their Kibbutzim.

No answer was received from the defense ministry and the IDF concerning implementation of this agreement, but a security official said he has learned that an intention exists to allow the return of the Nahal troops to the Kibbutzim in the near future.

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LIKUD CRITICIZED FOR HANDLING OF WEST BANK CRISIS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Apr 82 Weekend Supplement

[Article by Roman Prister: "What's Burning? Not Only Tires Are Burning in Nablus and El Bira; Likud Is PLO's Ally; Time Is Working Against Us, Hence Freezing of Autonomy Talks Is Counter-Productive; Hitting Demonstrators with Iron Fist Causes Quiet of a Graveyard...; Professors and Middle East Experts Analyze Israeli Policy in Judea and Samaria"]

[Text] During this time of stormy demonstrations, burning tires, drawn knives and uncontrolled shooting in Judea and Samaria, a placid visitor from London came to the Hebrew University--the editor of a British intellectual monthly, Melvin Lasky, and asked his Israeli friends: What are you doing? Don't you have rubber bullets to use against Arab demonstrators? Don't you have water guns to use against violent people in Ramallah or El Bira? Why do you have to shoot to kill and turn the moderates in the territories against you, as well as world public opinion?

Lasky, the intellectual, did not speak about morality or justice, only tactics. "It was a chat between horse thieves," Professor 'Immanuel Sivan said afterwards. "He came to us with the Irish experience, and we had the experience of the confrontations on the West Bank. Why only tactics? As a student of the Middle East I have come to the conclusion that the Israeli Government has made quite a few serious tactical errors, which it now tries to undo."

Such as?

"Such as for example the establishment of the civilian administration. What was the purpose of it? If the minister of defense had said that the Likud government had decided to establish a unilateral autonomy for the next 3 years, and the civilian administration was one of the bodies necessary to implement the plan, it would have been okay. But we see just the opposite. Since the Camp David accords there has been a steady erosion of the autonomy idea. Instead of striving to become less involved in everyday life in the territories, we become more and more involved. The civilian administration is of course instrumental in accelerating this process. I have never been able to understand what the point of this involvement is, if indeed the government wants to introduce the autonomy it has agreed on at Camp David, and why did we have to send inspectors to check the bookkeeping of Arab towns in the West Bank. I know

that their municipal officials are not exactly blameless, but is it our job to teach them a lesson in civics? Why do we have to write their school curriculum? Isn't it enough to make sure there is no incitement against Jews? Why do Israeli officials have to intervene in expanding a special ed school in Gaza, or deciding the number of beds in a hospital in Bethlehem? And now that we have fired the mayor of the three large cities on the West Bank, Nir Tzovar and Noam Tal will have to decide whether Fatima, the city worker, should be given a raise? We don't have enough problems of our own?

"The firing was necessary, because the three mayors incited the population according to the directives of the PLO? Without going into how true this accusation is, I maintain that we have to distinguish between maintaining law and order and taking political steps. I am not against punitive measures when such are needed, although recently we have witnessed brutal reaction in disproportion to what was taking place. This 'strong hand' policy cannot replace a rational policy that allows for a possible dialogue.

"Is there any chance of a dialogue? We talk to them all the time on ongoing matters. What did Menahem Milson do when he was an advisor for the territories? He visited Ilyas Furayj for an informal exchange of ideas and went to Nablus to find out what the PLO people in Beirut said to Bassam Shak'ah, or perhaps to relay a message to them through him. The two sides quickly learned the rules of this game. But the erosion and the freeze of the autonomy issue do not allow expanding the dialogue in any significant way.

"It doesn't matter, because the Arabs of the territories rejected the autonomy plan in any case? No, the picture is neither black nor rosy, and the residents of the territories are not all of one mind. Some of them are relatively moderate, and are willing to accept the original autonomy plan, along with some extra benefit, which will make them look good. For example, the right to vote for the Arabs of East Jerusalem, on a personal basis only, in keeping with Begin's idea of autonomy for people rather than for territory. I am convinced that many would have given it some serious thought, and would have thought twice before giving up the chance of a lifetime to run in the election for the administrative council of the autonomy.

"It is legitimate and it is acceptable to me, that in such election we would encourage a pro-Israeli party in Judea and Samaria. Perhaps the village leagues can play this role. But here too we have made a tactical error. We have created a contradiction. The head of the civilian administration maintains that we have to concentrate our efforts among the village people and the pro-Jordanians. But since the civilian administration has no political perspective, the Jordanians refuse to play its game. Worse yet, the village leagues have always been the exclusive turf of King Husayn. Now we come and we try to pull the rug from under him. No wonder he is angry. And anyone who blames the PLO for this does not know what he is talking about. What has happened here, is that we have created a monster which has turned against us. In our anxiety to start a dialogue with Jordan we have gotten ourselves into a serious confrontation with that country. Our lack of careful thinking and our political inconsistency are seen in another important question: how can we hope to have Jordan's support when Arik Sharon keeps saying that the true Palestinian homeland is on the

eastern bank of the Jordan. No king is happy about the thought of his downfall, and Husayn is certainly no exception.

"The King of Jordan is not interested in a dialogue with Israel--or a tacit agreement--because he is no longer interested in recovering the West Bank? The fact is true, but not the conclusion. It is safe to assume that he realizes that even if he gets back all the land he lost in the Six-Day War he will have to give it right back to the Palestinians. But in the meantime he wants to keep his influence in the West Bank, and so every Friday he sends directives to the preachers in the mosques, he supports his followers by paying their salaries, and he will help them gain key positions if an election is held for the autonomy council. This may be good for Israel, and certainly uncomfortable for the PLO. So why should we have a confrontation with Husayn?"

To sum up?

"We now have a ridiculous alliance. The PLO is now the ally of the Government of Israel, since the government has created a situation which leaves the Arabs of the territories no choice but to support the PLO. The other ally of the PLO are the Jews of the Diaspora, who do not come to live in Israel. The small immigration does not create any real threat in the demographic balance in Judea and Samaria against the Arabs. This is why even the moderates among the people of the PLO say from time to time: A settlement with Israel? We are in no rush."

PLO: On Whose Side Is Time?

If indeed the PLO is in no rush, what would have prompted its leaders in Beirut to prepare at this time a mass uprising in the territories? In the beginning of the week MA'ARIV published a statement by the government spokesman, according to which the security authorities have uncovered a secret plan for a mass revolt instigated by the PLO and the Saudis. The language of the statement raised certain questions in the mind of Mati Steinfeld, a scholar at the Advanced Studies Institute at the Hebrew University. In his opinion the leadership in Beirut is not interested in an all-out confrontation of the population in the territories with the "occupational forces." Steinfeld also found a contradiction within the statement. "It reveals that the plan was put into effect and that Israel acted accordingly. It also states that the plan was intended for May, but the security forces foiled it in time. Besides, the linking of the PLO and the Saudis was strange in light of the fact that the PLO had rejected Fahd's plan."

It is not the small inconsistencies that Steinfeld is concerned about. It is rather the mistaken notion about the PLO's intentions which seems to determine the government's policy in the territories and particularly toward the PLO.

"Why is the top leadership of the PLO at this time not interested in an armed revolt in the territories? There are two clear reasons: a) 'Arafat is aware of the military superiority of Israel and he has no doubt in his mind that such a revolt cannot succeed. On the contrary, a revolt can give Israel the excuse to expel all his supporters, and perhaps even a mass expulsion similar to 1948. b) It is agreed among the PLO leadership that the support the organization

receives in the territories is vital, but it is not decisive, since the fate of the territories will be decided outside of the disputed area, according to the standing of the PLO in the world. At this stage of the game the PLO is more interested in institutionalizing the support and the commitment of public figures in the territories rather than in an all out revolt. The nature of the institutionalization and the ways of bringing it about are the subject of a deep dispute within the PLO leadership."

Mati Steinfeld believes that 'Arafat and the leaders of Al Fatah (which is moderate in comparison to other factions in the PLO) did not want in the past nor do they want now a strong leadership in Judea and Samaria. Hence the firing of Ibrahim Tawil, Karim Kalaf, and Bassam Shak'ah did not hurt the basic position of the PLO and may have even played into its hands. "Since they believe that the future of the territories will be decided in the international arena and not on the battlefield in the Middle East, the leaders of the PLO in Beirut wish to maintain maximum control and they do not wish that crucial decision be obtained in Nablus or Ramallah. This does not mean that those in Beirut do not take the opinion of the residents of the territories into account. On the contrary, by force of circumstances the representatives of the West Bank were included in the top executive body of the PLO.

"All evidence in our hands shows that the Al Fatah leadership is deeply concerned that the leaders in the territories may try to take advantage of the relative distance of the PLO and of its need for their support, and will demand more freedom of action to the point of challenging the leadership in Beirut. This group is not so much concerned that the local leadership in the territories develop an alternative to the entire PLO, but rather to the Al Fatah itself within the framework of the PLO. In such case it would lean on such groups as The Popular Front and the Democratic Front which are considered perfectly loyal to the Palestinian cause, and Al Fatah will not be able to argue that the local leadership is leaning toward Jordan or Israel, since that leadership will be able to prove that its loyalty to the national cause was beyond reproach.

"The PLO establishment cannot free itself of the fear that if it gives the leaders in the territories more powers it may create a monster which will turn on its creator precisely because of its partial ego gratification. The expanding of domestic powers will inevitably detract from the foreign powers of the leadership in Beirut and will cause it irreparable damage."

Village Leagues: Nothing New Under the Sun

Unlike 'Arafat and his lieutenants, the more radical leaders in the PLO insist that the struggle in the territories should be intensified, and in order to do it more powers have to be transferred to the local leadership. But because of their determination to maintain unity within the PLO, the extremists refrain from implementing their plan. Decision was postponed in order not to split the organization by vying for the loyalty of the Arabs of the territories, some of whom still receive money from Jordan and must listen to what Jordan has to say.

The Israeli civilian administration attributes great importance to the village leagues as a way of stopping the PLO influence. Professor Vehoshua Porat, however, says that there is nothing new under the sun, and the village leagues experiment has failed once before.

"In 1922-23 Hayim Margalit Kalbrisky, PIKA's official, became aware of the displeasure of the village population with the rule of the city offialdom. He tried to use this conflict to further his own goals. Some village leaders openly expressed their support of the Jews, but for the most part the villagers preferred to remain neutral while the city politicians attacked the Zionists. In the end the whole thing was forgotten, because of the financial problems of the Zionist Federation. In the early thirties another attempt was made to re-vive the cooperation with the villages, but the nationalistic atmosphere of those days made it impossible to do anything. One should also mention here the "peace gangs" which were established by the villages in 1938 in order to defend themselves against Arab internal terrorism. The rebels took advantage of the situation at that time to settle personal accounts and even to engage in robbery. The British took advantage of the situation and supported the peace gangs with weapons and money and were given information which helped them subdue the revolt."

There are those who now refer to the new romance with the villages "cooperation with quislings." Is any attempt of a dialogue in the territories going to receive the same label?

Professor Porat: "If they are quislings, then we are Nazis, and the analogy shocks me. I am a person of moderate views, and therefore I respect those on the other side of the fence who are also moderates. I am a rational person, and it is clear to me I have to offer the Arab moderates an alternative they can live with. But our policy of eliminating the PLO from the territories does not help the moderates, since it is expansionistic by nature and it brands them as 'collaborators.'

"When I look at what we have done in the territories since 1967, I come to the conclusion that the Israeli rule has done its best to weaken the moderate leadership which is basically pro-Jordanian. A year ago the Van Lier Institute invited Menahem Milson and me to a discussion with Amnon Cohen and Rafael Vardi. We came with the intention of proving how stupid we were when we expelled the pro-Husayn leaders, who were the moderates in the territories, or when we intentionally prevented an agreement between our bank and the Jordanian bank for a joint operation in the West Bank, etc. To my surprise, no one disagreed. I recall how Rafael Vardi, who had served as the person in charge of implementing the government's policy in the territories, said openly: 'Yes, we did consider the Jordanians our main enemy at that time, and we acted accordingly.' And what happened after we liquidated the pro-Jordanian camp? We forgot that there is no vacuum in politics, and we held elections in 1976 and we brought the PLO to power! Karim Kalaf was created by us. The previous mayor of Ramallah, Nazim Zaru, was exiled to Jordan and even after his expulsion he did not do what others had been expelled did, namely, join the PLO.

"How, then, should we act? In the past I believed in the possibility of a settlement with the Jordanians. Now there is less of a chance, and we may

forfeit any hope of getting together with them if we persist with our useless plan of autonomy for people rather than territories and if we continue our fight against the PLO--and I do believe we have to fight it--without creating an alternative which will be acceptable to the Arabs of the territories. I believe that implementing the autonomy as formulated in the Camp David accords, for a transition period, until we return the territories to the Arabs, may be accepted in Amman even today."

What interest does Husayn have in getting back the West Bank? It is clear to everyone that he will have to give it back to the Palestinians.

Professor Porat: "I believe in the power of real interests. A Palestinian state under the patronage of the Russians and the Syrians is the kiss of death to Jordan, since such a state will surely want to liberate the Arabs east of the Jordan. Of course this conception is only valid if we go back to the old doctrine which maintains that Israel is not interested in toppling Husayn. The present government of Israel feels differently."

The future: The Quiet of a Graveyard

It is not possible to conduct negotiations with Jordan on the future of Judea and Samaria, if only for the simple reason that the Arab world has given the mandate for such negotiations to the PLO. This at least is how the situation is seen by Brig Gen (ret) Aryeh Shalev of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Yet despite the fact that Jordan is not a side in the negotiations, Shalev believes in the autonomy plan which he thinks may be eventually acceptable to the Jordanians. This is his scenario:

"I assume that it is possible to reach an agreement with the Egyptians on the initial implementation of the autonomy in the Gaza Strip only. At this stage of the talks the Egyptians are willing to start with the Gaza Strip, provided an agreement in principle is reached on the introduction of the autonomy in all the territories. I believe that can be amendable, if we agree to a broad autonomy, excluding security and foreign policy. It is also better for us to start with the Autonomy in the Gaza Strip, since there are only five Israeli settlements in the Strip, and the area is not connected to a hostile Arab country, hence the problem of security is not as acute here as it is in Judea and Samaria. If the Gaza autonomy experiment succeeds, with the pro-Egyptians having considerable influence, and if after 2 or 3 years the residents of the West Bank realize that the new arrangement is better than full occupation, there is no reason why they may not want to accept it. I am aware of the difficulties which stem from many problems, such as East Jerusalem, or our military domination of the excess to the autonomy, but if we don't try we will never know whether or not we have missed our big chance. Moreover, under the new conditions Husayn will have a certain interest in the autonomy in which his people will enjoy a status similar to the pro-Egyptians in the Gaza Strip.

"I realize this is an imaginary scenario, since it does not square with the political assumptions of the Likud government. But strengthening the Israeli rule without an autonomy plan leads to a dead end. Time is not on our side. The military superiority of Israel at this time is not in doubt, and it is convenient to start negotiations from a position of strength. But in the light

of the growing military strength of the Arab countries and the weakening of our political position in the world, it seems to me that in the future we may lose our position of strength, and we may as well try to be ahead of the game."

Still, the policy of strong hand has in the meantime calmed the situation in Judea and Samaria.

Aryeh Shalev: "True. But this is the quiet of a graveyard. Is this what we wanted?

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CSO: 4423/141

ISRAEL

IDF WANTS BORDER POLICE TO AID IN W. BANK, GAZA SECURITY

TA031045 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 May 82 p 2

[Report by the Military Correspondent]

[Text] In light of the increasing disturbances in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, the IDF wants border police units to be transferred to these regions to help with the burden of maintaining daily security. At the same time it was decided that IDF's presence in the territories will also be reinforced in the trouble spots, especially on main axes.

In the past the border police units handled security in a number of towns and regions. The border police units were at the time transferred to the Gaza Strip for a certain period as well.

Due to the recent disturbances the burden shouldered by the IDF has increased and in certain cases units had to be extracted from various duties, such as using Nahal members during their free service in setting up outposts in various sites in the territories. Other soldiers have to deal with policing tasks instead of routine training. It has now been decided to divide this burden between the IDF and the border police units.

Among other things the IDF is requesting that the police and border police be responsible for the various roadblocks and not army people, especially not reserve servicemen who change frequently. The army's appeal will be discussed between the defense minister and the interior minister, who is responsible for the police and border police.

CSO: 4400/257

EXTREMIST AGITATION AMONG ISRAELI ARABS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Mar 82 p 13

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "Everyone Meddles in Land Day"]

[Text] For the past 6 years there has been clamoring for a general strike among the Arabs in Israel on Land Day. The nationalistic groups Sons of the Village and the Progressive National Movement have spared no effort in passing a resolution calling for such a strike as a "minimal step of protest against the government's policy." This policy has been called such names as colonial, racist, savage, criminal etc.

The usual forum for raising this kind of demand is the convention of the Land Protection Committee, a front organization established by RAKAH in early 1976 before Land Day, when the government at the time decided to expropriate some 18,000 dunams of land in the Nazareth, Karmiel, and Safed areas. RAKAH's objection to calling a general strike has also become a tradition in the political life of the Arabs in Israel. Saliba Hamis, senior RAKAH representative in Land Protection Committee, has called his colleagues "lice" and "parasites" (trying to live off of RAKAH). Tawfiq Ziad, member of Knesset and mayor of Nazareth, has demanded several times in recent years to remove the representatives of the Sons of the Village from the meeting in Nazareth because they dared repeat this demand.

Easing of Tension

Last year there has been some lessening of tension between RAKAH and the two groups attacking it from the left and trying to replace it. Sons of the Village, active mainly in the northern West Bank, especially in Um al-Fahm, came closer to RAKAH when it became aware of the rise of a strong and dangerous common enemy--the Muslim groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. A representative of the Sons of the Village gave his blessing to RAKAH conventions, and the RAKAH newspapers suddenly stopped attacking this group. Even the Progressive National Movement, active mainly among Arab students, found a common language with RAKAH and reached a compromise on the distribution of seats in the committee to Arab students. They were given the power by the majority of the committee in Jerusalem, while HADASH was given Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Beer Sheva.

But the cease fire did not produce a change in the position of the two groups on Land Day. At the Acre convention last month a flier was distributed calling

for a general strike on Land Day, signed by the Progressive National Movement, and the Sons of the Village voiced a similar position from the speaker's stand. But the members of RAKAH who dominate the Land Protection Committee were able to pass a resolution quietly and effortlessly to hold three processions at historical resistance places of the original Land Day--Tayyibah, Kafir Kana, and Sahnin-'A'rabah. There was no sign of ferment at the Acre convention, and the general atmosphere was one of boredom and routine.

And yet, last Thursday a change took place. A lawyer named Walid Fahum called my house and gave one of my relatives a message from the mayor of Shefar'am, Ibrahim Namr Husin, who is also the national chairman of the Arab municipalities. This moderate politician, according to the message, denounces the actions of the Israeli Government in the territories, using strong words typical of RAKAH. He "denounces the harsh actions against the population in the conquered (...) territories who has caused the death of many in the hands of the army and brought about mass arrests. To my knowledge, Mr Fahum, the deputy mayor of Nazareth, is not the spokesman of Shefar'am, or of the Arab Municipalities Committee, and is not known to the members of my family, and so I suspected that some stranger was setting me up. I tried to check it out and the answer to my questions was unequivocal: the recent events in the West Bank cannot be ignored. Even Jewish members of the Labor party are shocked by them.

This kind of reaction quickly led to declaring a general strike. The Labor party office in the eastern Galilee "denounced the government's policy in the West Bank (...) which hurts the chances of peace and coexistence between Arabs and Jews. Young people from Nazareth who are close to RAKAH issued a flier signed "Arab High School Students Committee" calling for a strike on Friday of the high schools in the city, and no one stopped them. All the students left the classes and went home. The students in Shfaram, Tamra, and Avlin disturbed the classes on Saturday, and that same day the Land Protection Committee met in Haifa, having rejected a month earlier the idea of a general strike, and reversed its position. That afternoon the Arab Municipalities Committee met in Shefar'am, and although there was some hesitation, no one objected to the strike. It was decided to "endorse the decision of the Land Protection Committee and show understanding about its causes."

The members of RAKAH, who in the past did not hide the fact that their objection to the strike was not ideological but based on the fear that it might fail, were impressed by the response of the public to the idea of protesting the government's policy. Mr Binyamin Gur Aryeh, the prime minister's advisor for Arab affairs, argues that RAKAH takes advantage of recent events to try to recapture the political power it lost in the last election, and there may be more than a grain of truth in this. RAKAH was badly hurt in the last election and lost its momentum of taking over the Arab community. The general strike scheduled for today will help RAKAH prove it is still the leader.

Mr Gur Aryeh's last moment attempt to organize opposition to the strike does not do away with this trend. School is bound to be affected. Many parents will not send their children to school for fear that they might get hurt and thus will indirectly contribute to the success of the strike. A small group can cause commotion and gain publicity, and there is no doubt that the general

feeling of the Arabs in Israel is one of anger and frustration because of the strong hand of the military government in the territories, and this will help the call to strike. Many will come to the meetings, and the police barriers will help the television camera crews present the Arab population as "dissident."

Yesterday, however, while this article was being written, the only gathering in Nazareth was near the central post office. Hundreds of elderly people lined up for their social security checks. The only large poster seen in the city was an ad by the Mashbir Merkazi which yesterday opened its first supermarket in the center of Nazareth. The RAKAH people did not distribute their paper until 9 am. Ra'anan Cohen, chairman of the Arab section of the Labor party, and Member of Knesset Muhammad Watad from MAPAM joined the prime minister's Arab affairs advisor in an attempt to prevent the strike. But on the other hand MAPAM called on its Arabs members to attend the meetings and not to cause disturbances. Mr Latif Dori, of MAPAM's Arab section, told me that he believed the Arabs had a right to express their opinion, and that the strike is a way of expressing that opinion. The spokeswoman of the Bir Zeit University Solidarity Committee expressed solidarity with the Arab call for a strike "against the policy of Ariel Sharon who tries to destroy the Palestinian Arabs as a political entity." The organizers of strikes also receive help from the PLO, Syria and Jordan, which have started a propaganda campaign to encourage the strike ("The Central Committee of the PLO congratulates the organizers of the strike who have demonstrated the unity of the Palestinian people.")

AL-ITTIHAD, RAKAH's newspaper which is usually issued on Tuesday, came out earlier this time and published an editorial which states that the minister of defense should know that the time of the "liquidation of the Indians" is over, and RAKAH activists went out this morning to bus stations and to marketplaces to try to persuade the workers not to go out to work and the merchants to close their stores.

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ISRAEL, FRANCE SIGN COOPERATION PROTOCOLS

Economic, Technological Projects

TA021611 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 May 82 p 3

[Report from Paris by Edwin Eytan]

[Excerpts] In Paris on Friday Israel and France signed a number of "agreement memorandums" on joint economic and technological projects. The agreements were signed at the conclusion of a 2-day session of the joint France-Israel committee, which convened after being inactive for more than a dozen years.

In addition to the memorandums signed on Friday, it was decided by the heads of the two delegations--deputy director general of the French foreign ministry,--to propose several Israeli-French economic projects to a number of African states. This is the first time that France has agreed to involve a third country in its dealings with French-speaking African countries.

It should be noted that the sole difficulties in the negotiations occurred during discussions on tourism projects. The Israelis proposed the two countries draft joint plans for Christian pilgrims who would be able to visit the city of Lourdes in France, a holy place for Roman Catholics, and also East Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The French rejected this proposal for political reasons, apparently not wanting to be involved in any form whatsoever in matters connected to the "occupied territories." In the end, a settlement was reached with Nazareth, instead of East Jerusalem as the site for visits to Israel.

Among the memoranda of understanding signed on Friday:

- 1) A general memorandum on economic and technological cooperation between the two countries.
- 2) Investment concessions for investors on both sides.
- 3) An agreement intended to encourage and widen commerce between the two countries.
- 4) The setting up of a joint fund which will finance joint projects.

- 5) A secret agreement on joint projects in third countries--that is, in Africa.
- 6) A tourism agreement that will enable tourists from the Far East who fly to France to visit Lourdes to also make a short pilgrimage to Israel to visit Nazareth. Israel, for its part, will help France by steering tourists from the United States, mainly Jews, to France.

Further Details

TA011134 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 1 May 82

[Text] France and Israel have decided to convene the next meeting of the joint economic committee common to both countries in Jerusalem. It will meet next year. The French minister of research and technology has been invited for an official visit to Israel. The talks by the joint economic committee ended in Paris last night. The heads of the Israeli delegation pointed out that the talks had been very important because by the very fact of the meeting, President Mitterrand's declarations made during his visit to Israel had been fulfilled. The Director of the Ministry of Finance, 'Ezra Sadan, told our correspondent Gil'ad Sher that the results of the deliberations to date were positive and it appears that in all the fields there will be a continuation of the negotiations.

The Director of the Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, met yesterday with the president's adviser on African affairs and with the general secretary of the Presidential Palace. No details have been reported on the talks.

CSO: 4400/258

'MA'ARIV'ON SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AIR BATTLE

TA221422 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Apr 82 p 5

[Commentary by Ya'akov Erez: "The IDF on Two Fronts"]

[Excerpt] It seems that the long weeks of waiting during which bitter internal debates were held have had their effect. The IDF undertook in Lebanon a method of air attack which was routine in the past. Contrary to fears, the IDF acted in a limited fashion, focusing on three targets. The hope was expressed that the terrorists would learn a lesson: That a cease-fire is an agreement between two sides.

The limited strike method, such as was carried out yesterday, proves that in the government the voice of the moderates, at this stage, has gained the upper hand. Indeed, in the eyes of some experts the IDF action yesterday is not sufficient and its method of execution is not original and cannot be presented as different from the past. But in this way it is perhaps possible to stop the escalation and maintain the calm. Following the statements yesterday by the Chief of Army Intelligence it is possible to express the hope, or wish, or belief, that the terrorists' reactions will be restrained.

This is only one aspect of the air activity in the north. There is, however, another aspect of worrisome significance. Yesterday the Syrians flew dozens of the most modern fighters. For the first time dogfights took place between IDF aircraft and MIG-23's. The result: The downing of two Syrian MIG's, with all our planes returning safely to base. But the fact that the Syrians yesterday put a large number of aircraft into the air proves that they do not intend to abstain from action. The Syrian tendency, as it manifested itself yesterday, indicates Damascus' intention to come to the aid of the terrorists if they are attacked by Israel. Therefore, it must be taken into account, with a greater degree of probability than existed before yesterday, that an extensive flareup in the north is liable to cause a confrontation with Syria.

CSO: 4400/258

CORPORATION WITH KUWAITI TIES HOLDS CONTACTS

TA230846 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Apr 82 p 17

[Report by Charles Hoffman]

[Text] The head of the International Conglomerate LONRHO, which is partly owned by members of the Kuwaiti royal family, was in Israel this week to discuss joint ventures with the government in electronics, aviation and oil exploration.

Energy Minister Yitzhaq Berman confirmed that he and Trade and Industry Minister Gidion Pat had met with Roland "Tiny" Rowland, head of LONRHO, which is based in Britain. Berman expressed regret that word of the contacts had leaked through Israeli sources in London. Ministry sources, however, said they expect that the contacts would continue and that there is a "very good" chance that the deal will go through.

Members of the Kuwaiti royal family bought a major share of LONRHO in the early 1970s and today own 15 percent. The firm has extensive investments in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Berman was recently in London attempting to mobilize private funds for investment in energy projects in Israel, and will continue these efforts there next week. Projects such as pilot plants to exploit new energy sources or oil exploration are very expensive and require outside funds, the ministry spokesman said.

While in Britain recently Berman secured an agreement with the National Coal Board to extend technological aid to Israel.

CSO: 4400/258

ISRAEL

NEW WASHINGTON EMBASSY APPOINTMENTS APPROVED

TA291514 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Apr 82 p 2

[Report by Ilan Kfir, Political Correspondent]

[Text] Engineer Binyamin Netanyahu, aged 34, will be appointed minister plenipotentiary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, following the Foreign Ministry Workers' Union withdrawal of its opposition to the appointment. He is the younger brother of the late Lt Col Yehonatan Netanyahu, who died during the Entebbe operation.

There was a bitter clash over this appointment between Foreign Minister Shamir and the Foreign Ministry's Worker's Union, which objected to the appointment on the grounds that Mr Netanyahu is not a member of the foreign service.

The Foreign Ministry Appointment Committee this week decided to appoint Dr 'Oded 'Eran, one of the top officials in the Foreign Ministry's Egyptian Division, as Minister-Counsellor in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. He will be in charge of liaison with the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Dan Korem has been appointed Counsellor for Press and Information, and will work under Minister Harry Hurwitz.

CSO: 4400/257

POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN ISRAELI MK SARID, PLO MEMBERS IN PARIS

TA271344 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Apr 82 p 2

[Report from Paris by Tamar Golan]

[Text] "I will participate in every meeting with PLO members which may help pave the way and prepare hearts for a dialogue between the two parties and for mutual recognition," Alignment MK Yosi Sarid said in Paris yesterday. Last minute intensive efforts are now being conducted with the objective of bringing about a meeting between Sarid and a member of the PLO leadership, 'Isam Sartawi, before Sarid's return to Israel tomorrow.

MK Sarid talked in a news conference convened by an umbrella organization of Jewish bodies from the socialist left which are active for the sake of "an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue."

MK Sarid said that "it is not impossible that a meeting with PLO members, including 'Isam Sartawi, will be held." According to him such a meeting has not yet been held since "the friends" who can organize it believe it is not the right time for it yet.

Sarid specified the main points of the peace plan adopted by the Ometz [Hebrew acronym for political, Zionist opposition; a dovish group formed in the Labor Party] group in Israel: Future negotiations will be based on mutual recognition of both peoples for self determination; it is possible to settle for Palestinian readiness for negotiations and there is no need to present the cancellation of the Palestinian charter as a condition for negotiations; it is the Palestinians themselves who should determine whether they want a state, a confederation or any other form of government; the Palestinian entity will be set up in the framework of settling the question of the territories occupied in 1967; Israel will at certain strategic points maintain for 15 years a military presence in the area for the purpose of deterrence.

The news conference was conducted under strengthened police guard. Policemen in uniforms and plainclothes were standing on the pavement and in the entrance to the hall. An armoured car of the police elite unit was parked in the street outside the hall.

CSO: 4400/257

ISRAEL

GOLAN DRUZE ID CARD APPLICATIONS, REQUIREMENTS

ID Card Law Applies to Druze

TA231332 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 23 Apr 82

[Text] The attorney general has determined that for purposes of identification the law applying to the Druze is the same as that applying to all Israelis, and whoever does not carry an identification card or fails to present it as required is committing a crime. In a memorandum to the directors general of the government ministries, the attorney general wrote that in other cases such as the provision of services or granting of licenses by government ministries the Druze should be treated like other citizens and they should not be required to present identification cards in all cases.

Golan Druze Citizenship Applications

TA260733 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 26 Apr 82

[Text] Forty-one Golan Heights Druze have applied for Israeli citizenship. This is the first time in 15 months that Golan Druze have applied for citizenship. Our correspondent, Yo'el Dar, reports that a few dozen other Druze have applied to the interior ministry to again issue identification cards to them, explaining that they had lost them or that they had not been supplied to them during the joint operation when identification cards were distributed by the interior ministry and the IDF.

The Interior Ministry does not accept this explanation and believes that the majority of these cards were deliberately destroyed under pressure of pro-Syrian Druze on the Golan Heights. The Druze applying for citizenship claim that they had returned their cards due to the religious and social pressure exerted on them. Our correspondent has been informed that each application will be examined and that identification cards will not be issued automatically.

CSO: 4400/257

ISRAEL

DETAILS OF PLAN FOR ENDING DRUZE STRIKE

TA030728 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 3 May 82

[Report by Yo'el Dar--recorded]

[Text] The plan drafted by Shaykh Nur ad-Din Halabi to end the Druze strike actually constitutes a compromise between the position of the authorities who demand that the Golan Heights Druze accept Israeli identification cards without any preconditions and the explicit declaration of the inhabitants not to apply to them the annexation law.

Shaykh Halabi proposes requiring all the inhabitants to carry identification cards, but that in exchange they be given the possibility of choosing their nationality and citizenship. In other words, the Druze in the Golan Heights will be able to ask that the interior ministry register their nationality as Arab Druze and their being subjects to either Israel or Syria. According to one estimate, 80 percent of the inhabitants will seek to inscribe in their identification cards that they belong to the Arab Druze nation; 15 percent that they are Druze by nationality and Israeli subjects, and only 5 percent will seek to explicitly inscribe that they are Syrian subjects.

Shaykh Halabi has announced that those seeking to declare themselves Syrian subjects will not enjoy the various benefits granted by the state to the Druze in the Golan Heights and will be thus compelled to forego child allowances.

This plan was presented to the leaders of the Golan Heights Druze for consideration and they have accepted it. Shaykh Salman Tahir Abu-Salah, the spiritual leader, has told those close to him that he personally will not seek to declare himself a Syrian subject but he did not expand. Qadi Halabi, a resident of the village of Daliyat al-Karmel, is hoping to persuade the government ministers to adopt the compromise plan and if they do so we will soon witness an end to the strike.

CSO: 4400/257

PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES RAISED

TA041129 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 May 82 pp 1, 2

[Report by the Economic Affairs Correspondent]

[Excerpt] The prices of basic commodities and fuel were raised by about nine percent at midnight by decision of the treasury in consultation with other ministries.

The finance and transport ministries also decided to raise public transportation prices by 25 percent, effective 16 May.

The communication ministry is to ask the Knesset Finance Committee to approve a 25 percent raise in the price of telephone and postal rates.

As a result of the increase in the price of fuel a further application to the committee will be made by the energy ministry to approve a 6 percent rise in the electricity rates.

The energy ministry said that the 8 percent average rise in fuel prices reflects a 10 percent devaluation of the shekel in relation to the dollar since the last price rise in mid-March, and the slight drop in crude oil prices in recent months.

The treasury justification for the price hike is that it is necessary to prevent subsidizing fuel or an increase in subsidies for food.

The adjustment in subsidized food products represents a continuation of the treasury's policy of creeping rises in the prices of these commodities.

The finance ministry expects these increases to raise the consumer price index by 1.5 percent during May and June, which are considered to be months with a lower rate of inflation than April month's.

The relatively steep hikes in the public transportation and communication rates were explained as necessary to reduce their rate of subsidy from over 100 percent to 60 percent, in the case of communications, and 85 percent for public transportation. This means that even after the price rises the government adds 60 to 85 agorot for every shekel the consumer spends on such services.

CSO: 4400/257

ISRAEL

HEBRON LEADERS, RESIDENTS APPEAL ON LAND SEIZURE

TA040628 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 4 May 82

[Text] Acting Hebron Mayor Mustafa 'Abd an-Nabi Natshah, the Municipal Council members and other landowners in Hebron yesterday appealed to the high court of justice against the seizure of their lands by the military authorities. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria Arye Gus reports:

[Begin recording] The acting mayor, the municipal council members and the landowners appeal against the Judaea and Samaria commander and against the person in charge of government and absentee property. They requested the court order then to show cause why they should not desist from expropriating their land. The appeal by the 28 landowners was joined by Acting Hebron Mayor Mustafa 'Abd an-Nabi Natshah and the municipal council members who reason that expropriating land located within the bounds of the municipality means reducing the area of the municipalities. The appellants' attorney, Mrs Felicia Langer, writes in the appeal that in question are 320 dunams on which--to the surprise of the owners--the military authorities began work about a year ago. The appeals committee which the landowners had approached finally rejected their claim since the attorney who had previously handled their case--who, according to the landowners, came down with heart disease--did not turn up at the hearing. Later they again turned to the appeals committee but were surprised by the renewed work in the area. They were informed that in the near future a military nahal nucleus will move into place. The appellants contend that the argument on the need to establish a military settlement--following months during which there was not the slightest hint about this--indicates its falsehood. Alternatively they claim that the military settlement is only a short stage prior to converting the point into a civilian settlement. Therefore, they are asking the court also to issue an interim order which will instruct cessation of works at the site until the appeal has been heard. [End recording]

CSO: 4400/257

THOUSANDS OF HOUSING UNITS APPROVED FOR SETTLEMENTS

TA301506 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 3

[Report by Avraham Dishon]

[Excerpts] The agriculture ministry will soon increase its supervision of bodies dealing with the sale of lands in Judaea and Samaria. This step was decided upon following numerous complaints by those acquiring lands there from which it emerged that seasoned merchants had deceived them and sold them land without building permits and without the orderly transfer of land ownership.

The Ministerial Settlement Committee recently approved a plan for the building of thousands of housing units in the areas of Judaea and Samaria. This building will be done at the expense of the settlers themselves in the framework of the build your own home project according to which the settler finances the building along with some of the development expenses. Those acquiring lots must complete the construction of their homes within 18 months.

According to the new plan, very recently approved by the Ministerial Settlement Committee, approval was given for the establishment of the following settlements:

- 1) Elqana "D" (Shaykh Sabah): On 1,200 dunams of private land, acquired by the Gal Company in cooperation with the residents of Elqana, the setting up of 1,200 housing units is planned.
- 2) Elqana "B" (Mashah): On 420 dunams of private land acquired by the company for developing residential neighborhoods in Judaea and Samaria 800 housing units will be constructed.
- 3) Yaqir "B" (West of Yaqir): On 200 dunams of state land 1,300 housing units will be built by private entrepreneurs.
- 4) Modi'in Gardens (Ganey): On 470 dunams of private land acquired by the company for the development of residential neighborhoods in Judaea and Samaria 450 housing units solely for a religious and Orthodox population will be built.

5) Na'ala "B": On an area of 1,000 dunams of state land 1,100 housing units will be established.

All these settlements are situated in the lower part of Samaria and the residents will continue to work in the central part of Israel.

The establishment of a new settlement, Ne'ot Adumim, was also approved. It is to be located on the road between ('Ubadiyah) and the Mar Saba Monastery, near the future road of Ma'ale Adumim and 'Arad. At this stage 150 housing units will be built and the residents will work in tourism, summer resorts, industry and various services.

CSO: 4400/258

BRIEFS

SOVIET IMMIGRATION FOR APRIL--In April 288 Jews left the Soviet Union, of whom 85--or some 30 percent--immigrated to Israel, whereas all the others immigrated to the West with the help of the Satmar Hassidim's Rav Tov Organization and the HIAS organization. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh notes that the drop in the number of people leaving the Soviet Union continues. [Text] [TA041116 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 4 May 82]

GOVERNMENT MONEY INJECTION--In April 1982 the government injected 1.822 billion shekels into the market. This sum is somewhat smaller than what had been feared in the treasury. According to Bank of Israel statistics, the foreign currency reserves grew by \$10 million last month, reaching \$2,869 million. [Text] [TA041226 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 4 May 82 p 2]

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS SETTLEMENT--Communications ministry workers are setting up a large communal settlement on a hill in Samaria opposite the settlement of Bet Arye. The settlement will include mainly villas and the government has already allotted 800 dunams to it. Our correspondent, Gadi Sukenik, said senior officials of the communications ministry, including the ministry's director, are among the initiators of the plan. [Text] [TA300718 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 30 Apr 82]

FOOD, MEDICINE TO POLAND--Poland has permitted the Israeli People's Committee for Solidarity with the Polish people to send food and medicine to Poland. As a result of this, committee leaders have issued a call to the Israeli public to come to the aid of the Polish people. [Excerpt] [TA021835 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 2 May 82]

HAITIAN SECRET POLICE AID--Israel has been sending internal security experts to Haiti to aid the infamous (Tonton Macoute) secret police of "Baby Doc" Duvalier. This was reported by the Parisian weekly, LE POINT. The periodical, considered reliable, writes in its latest issue that in the last 4 years Israel has sent to Haiti French-speaking agriculture experts. Now, the weekly continues, Israel has added to them "technicians for psychological warfare who are about to help the Haitian security services." [Telegraphed report from Paris by Edwin Eytan] [Text] [TA021329 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 May 82 p 4]

IDF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER APPOINTED--Brig Gen Arye Ben-Tov has been appointed as chief intelligence officer in the IDF. He is replacing Brig Gen Tzvi Schiller who will be appointed to another senior IDF post. [TA010711 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 30 Apr 82]

SOLAR POOL--A solar pool stretching over 250 dunams planned to generate 5 megawatts of electricity, will be completed this year and electricity will be generated in 1983. At present the first pool is in the final building stages in the northern part of the Dead Sea. [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Apr 82 p 2 TA]

EAST JERUSALEM ORGANIZATIONS THREATS--An organization which signs itself the Area Village League Battalions is continuing to harass public institutions in East Jerusalem with letter threats whose tone is becoming more and more sharp. Meanwhile, our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports the Area League Village Leagues deny any connection with the letter threats. Last night a letter of this type was received by a Muslim charitable organization in the Jabal (Mukabar) neighborhood, on the fringes of East Talpiot neighborhood. The letter demands that the members of the organization stop publishing political announcements in East Jerusalem newspapers, and says that if they do not they will be killed. [Text] [TA240940 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 24 Apr 82]

W. BANK EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--Some 76,000 Judaea, Samaria and Gaza workers--or one-third of all employed people from the territories--find their employment in Israel. This emerges from data compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The data shows that there has been no increase in the number of people employed in Israel compared with last year, and also that last year there was a slight rise in the number of West Bank residents employed in construction work and a slight drop in the number of those employed in industry. [Text] [TA031828 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 3 May 82]

INVADING, OCCUPING PARTS OF LEBANON---According to former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Israel had considered invading and occupying parts of Lebanon before deciding on Wednesday's air strike. Eban said the Labor Party had been approached for support but would not commit itself on the question of ground forces. Eban said he thought the parties would not be able to keep the peace without U.S. help but he was sure the Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt would survive. [Text] [TA230552 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 23 Apr 82]

CSO: 4400/258

MAURITANIA

OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC TAKEOFF EXAMINED

Paris AFRICA in French No 140, Apr 82 pp 21-23

[Article by Attilio Gaudio: "The Fictitious State"]

[Text] Since the ouster of President Ould Daddah, Mauritania has experienced a series of coups d'etat, overturned foreign alliances and internal "purges." The many national problems, added to the proliferation of political factions in the leadership class (pro-Moroccan, pro-Algerian, pro-Saharan, pro-Iraqi, pro-Libyan), maintain a climate of instability. Thus, at a time when the Organization of African Unity was preparing to make decisions on the Saharan conflict, another attempted coup was foiled in Nouakchott. Furthermore, in order to show that President Khouna Ould Haidalla was not without friends, in the 48 hours following the arrest of the plotters -- his former comrades in arms and in government -- Algiers sent two very highly-placed envoys to Nouakchott. They were immediately received by Mauritanian Prime Minister Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya.

It is thought that Ould Saleck, one of the protagonists in the abortive coup and the author of the putsch that ousted Moktar Ould Daddah in July 1978, organized that coup out of opposition to the excessively pro-Algerian policy of the current government, which undoubtedly opened Mauritania's doors to the Algerians after the bloody pro-Moroccan attempt of March 1981. Those behind the 6 February plot were sentenced at the beginning of March to 10 years in prison and the confiscation of their property.

What could have been the true purposes of the conspirators? All hypotheses are possible, but at any rate, one former minister told us in a bitter, disillusioned way, even if the coup had succeeded, Mauritania "would have changed colonels once more, but not regimes."

Opposition to Regime

While opposition to the military regime of President Haidalla remains divided and "silent" in Nouakchott among the population, a certain number of former officers, merchants, teachers and high officials -- Moors as well as Blacks -- do not hide their sympathy for the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD), whose permanent secretary is the former governor and former director of planning, Moustapha Ould Abeiderrahmane. These sympathizers are more nostalgic for the civilian, liberal regime of former president Ould Daddah than they are supporters of Morocco.

For the AMD, Colonel Abdelkader and the military men who on 16 March 1981 used force to oust the "illegitimate regime of Colonel Haidalla (all executed) are true patriots" who tried to free the nation from an unpopular, divided and incompetent dictatorship which used force to put an end to the only legitimate central government that the country has ever known and which capitulated shamefully before the POLISARIO and its protectors.... The AMD maintains that Mauritania is now more implicated than ever in the Saharan conflict and "has nothing more to defend for itself."

In other words, Haidalla's military regime is not neutral because it has made Mauritania one of the stakes in this regional conflict and, by betraying its old, natural alliances (with Morocco), has pushed it, out of fear, into the camp of the destabilizers of West Africa (Algeria and Libya).

Grave Problem of Slaves

Here again, the liberal opposition accuses the military of having presented as a revolutionary innovation a measure that already figured in the previous constitution and of having favored the masters over the slaves by recognizing the right of ownership of the former through the institution of a commission whose sole mission is to evaluate, not the immense harm suffered by the slaves for centuries, but the amount of indemnification paid to the masters.

After their conquest of Mauritania in the 17th century, the Moors took possession of the entire territory as far as the Senegal River, reducing the black population to slavery. When the blacks later began to be emancipated, they became free men (*Haratins*) who owed part of the harvest or a tribute to their former masters. According to one high official in the Mauritanian Government, thousands of Haratins continue to pay those tributes today, especially because they fear not going to heaven, a belief which the Moorish religious leaders have successfully imprinted on the minds of the slaves over the centuries.

It is because of their essentially nomadic and very isolated existence that the Moors long remained outside the antislavery movement that began in the West. But the repeated droughts over the past 10 years have forced a large number of Moors to emigrate from their Saharan deserts toward the south, toward Nouakchott, in the hope of finding work that does not exist, while preserving the old master-slave structure.

The nomads have built a vast shantytown in the shadow of the mosque, but urban life is increasingly giving the slaves a political awareness and these socioeconomic changes probably announce the death of the old Mauritanian feudal system, even if they are long in arriving in the heart of the desert where 70 percent of the Mauritanian people live and where many Moorish chiefs are still too proud to do the slightest manual labor. Moreover, they claim that no slave seeks to leave their tent, where they are treated like members of the family.

This is not the opinion of some religious leaders in Nouakchott, who affirm that the existence of the slaves is pure hell. When they are old and useless, they are left to die like dogs, it is said. In the Senegal Basin, the Haratins

continue to work land belonging to the Moors by Islamic law. The owners visit them once a year to receive their portion of the crop, which varies between one-tenth and one-fifth. Even in government offices, one still finds Harratins who pay part of their meager salary to their masters. In religious circles, it is thought that the slaves are beginning to emerge from the Middle Ages, guided by a black political movement that seeks social and political equality with the Moors, but that it will take at least two more generations before Mauritania completely gives up slavery.

And yet, slavery was officially abolished in 1980 by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN), delivering authorities from a thorny problem that has constantly hindered the country's development since independence. Inextricable conflicts between masters and slaves are born of a certain ambiguous attitude of the administration, which considered the phenomenon as "a social fact that should disappear with the evolution of society." It has sometimes happened that the slave, who had abandoned his master, has been returned through the aid of local authorities.

The emergence of the Harratins movement, which demonstrated strongly in various places in the country in order to protest the sale of a slave in northern Mauritania, and the pressure brought to bear by the more avant-garde strata of Mauritanian youth have brought authorities to make a radical decision in order to prevent racial tension from developing between the black minority and the Moors.

Enviable International Aid

Mauritania has become the crossroads of international aid to West Africa, to such a point that Nouakchott is offered gifts and credits exceeding its requests. This generosity is not without ulterior motives and the Moors, those nomadic shepherds of Arab-Berber origin, have no illusions and are not too easily influenced by their backers. "The Mauritanians do not understand why Europeans and Japanese, Russians and Americans absolutely want to turn them into sedentary people, farmers or city dwellers, livestock herders or miners, blue- or white-collar workers, when the Moorish people have always lived happily in tents, raising goats and camels, without any other limits than the horizon," the minister of culture told us.

In theory, the CMSN wants to launch a vast program of economic and social recovery, beginning with an agrarian reform, an increase in the minimum wage, the construction of housing, free medical care. Actually, dissension within the leadership, the apathy of officials, the fear of trade unionists too committed under the old regime and the grousing of commercial circles allow everything to stagnate. Everything is in jeopardy. Handicrafts are disappearing. The famous Mederdra coffers cannot be found, bracelets of ebony and silver wire cost double what they do in Dakar, and rugs are no longer woven.

The very few construction projects seem to have ground to a halt. The Saudi mosque has remained incomplete for at least 5 years, along with the palace of justice offered by Qatar. Not one meter of tar has improved the streets of the capital since the ouster of Ould Daddah and Nouakchott looks more and more

like a huge refugee camp. This capital, which was never an esthetic success and which was designed for 50,000 inhabitants, has become the sad camp of 350,000 former nomads, where every esplanade is a seedy desert flea market, loaded with shoddy plastic and used clothing, but without the color and attractiveness of the great Saharan souks of yesterday.

The desalinization plant at the port has totally shut down and it will take eight or nine months of work for the Italian technicians to get the sugar mill machinery back into operation. Too many officials and even management personnel lounge around on the sand, chatting, smoking or drinking tea, while their offices in the ministries stand empty, sandy and often visited by goats! The newspaper CHAAB is nearly bankrupt and the presses are broken down with no spare parts.

Too Fragile National Identity

As the minister of rural development explained to us, these problems are complicated by the great cultural diversity existing between the six main ethnic groups and the numerous subgroups residing in Mauritania. Despite the centralizing efforts of former President Moktar Ould Daddah for 20 years, the national identity and the community and civic spirit stemming from it are still in the most basic stage of development. On the other hand, the identity and power of the ethnic groups taken separately remain intact.

The weakness of most development plans or approaches to national-type measures suggested by international experts and the embassies of countries financially aiding Mauritania resides in the fact that the negative elements due to the traditional structures and the innate behavior of Moorish society are not taken into account, which makes its participation in certain programs of modernization and productivity in agriculture, industry, fishing and administrative and technological management unpredictable.

One sector with constant, serious gaps under the old regime as well as that of the colonels is that of school education. Literacy for everyone and national training of a skilled Moorish work force is a lure, at least for the time being. Authorities demonstrate a lack of interest and even of responsibility that is painful at the regional level. Formulas such as "planned development," "personnel training," "increased investments," "reform of land ownership law," "the coordination of projects" and "permanent work units," used by the ministries, have no real meaning in the field.

Burden of Colonization

And yet, the absence of this impossible economic takeoff of Mauritania is not only attributable to the last military governments, as the AMD thinks, or to former President Ould Daddah, as the colonels are bent on showing. In the beginning, there was definitely the negative factor of colonization comparable to no other. For the French, Mauritania did not exist as an "indigenous single entity." It was treated as a piece of the Sahara to be subjugated and controlled militarily, solely in terms of the strategic and security needs relating to Morocco, on the one hand, and the AOF [French West Africa], on the other.

And Ould Daddah knew perfectly well, even if he did not say so, that without the war in Algeria, without the demands of Allal-el-Fassi at the same time for the establishment of a "Greater Morocco," and without the discovery of the Idjil iron mountain, De Gaulle would probably never have tolerated the creation of an *ex novo* Mauritanian nation.

In leaving this sandy country of deceptive peace, one cannot help being puzzled. When the small Air Mauritania plane comes into sight of Dakar after an hour's flight, it is as if one were in another world. In the distance, Mauritania seems frozen in the desert without any real possibilities of moving toward a modern, technological development as the world now conceives it.

But who is to say that it is not precisely in that inertia that the secret of a strength of preservation which time has turned into wisdom resides? The fact remains, however, that this nation doomed to sail eternally on the Saharan sea awaits captains who can handle the wheel.

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CSO: 4519/163

TUNISIA

PREMIER CALLS SAUDI PLAN 'POSITIVE'

GF200922 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0815 GMT 20 May 82

[Text] Al-Shariqah, 20 May (WAKH)--Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali has described Saudi Arabia's peace plan as containing positive points to find a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East issue.

He asserted that if the plan becomes an Arab initiative through an Arab summit, it will puzzle and perplex the Israeli enemy and will result in winning the friendship of influential and weighty countries. He said the plan is controversial in order to win the Palestinians' approval. [sentence as received]

In a statement to the newspaper AL-KHALIJ published today, the Tunisian prime minister called for ending the Iraqi-Iranian war through peaceful means and for negotiations between the two countries. He also expressed regret over the Iranian regime's stand toward the Islamic good office committee's proposals to resolve the crisis.

On his country's stand on the Arab summit, Mr Mzali asserted Tunisia's support for holding the postponed Fes summit on the condition that suitable and convenient circumstances are created for this summit.

Mr Mzali also expressed regret over the rifts existing among the Arab countries, a thing which poses a threat to the Arab nation. He urged that any Arab resolution on Egypt's return be issued by an Arab summit, because any Arab resolution that is not issued by an Arab summit will only widen and deepen Arab divisions.

CSO: 4500/170

AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PROJECT DESCRIBED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 21 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by Sadok Ben Hamza: "The Agro-Industrial Complex of Tebourba, a Pole of Development in the Region"]

[Text] In the course of his visit to the governorate of Zaghouan, the prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, dedicated some completed economic and social projects and laid the cornerstones of various projects. The agro-industrial complex of Tebourba, which was indisputably the most important project for which the prime minister laid the cornerstone, will help to metamorphose the economic, and more precisely the agricultural, aspect of the region. The complex, which is unique of its kind from the point of view of its emigrant-worker capacity and its quality, was launched by a Tunisian emigrant. Sadok Ben Hamza explains the purpose of his project as follows.

Creation of 400 Jobs

In view of the inability of the industrial units of the lower zone of the Medjerda to absorb all the agricultural production, especially in mid-season, the "Tunisian agricultural and industrial complex" enterprise proposes principally to remedy this deficiency and aims at ensuring a better future for agricultural production in the region. Our objective is to help toward better coordination among the producers, the transformation sector and both the internal and external markets, with a view to providing the region with an infrastructure for storing products and protecting them from any depredation, on the one hand, and on the other, to help toward an adjustment of prices in favor of the producers and the consumers. To help our enterprise get started under good conditions, it is important to enable us to operate the agricultural farms presently run by the production units. For our part, we commit ourselves to working these lands in a rational manner.

I have already asked the governor to permit us to take a long-term lease on certain farms, to be run by sophisticated means and methods.

The Tunisian agricultural and industrial complex will be centered on the transformation of agricultural products into vegetables and fruits tied in with in-

termediate industries, thereby making it possible to change the strictly agricultural economy into an agro-industrial economy that can ensure food self-sufficiency, first of all, and then food for export.

We are very proud to announce that this project will permit the creation of 400 stable jobs, with a wage mass of D 5 million, in addition to the social benefits that the families of the employees will enjoy,

As regards the launching of the project, we have taken all the needs of the region into account, in order for it to be an important economic pole that aids in the development of Tunisia. It is the fruit of the effort of Tunisian cadres whose competence and devotion no longer need to be demonstrated. As a Tunisian citizen who had emigrated abroad, I have chosen the best way to contribute, for my part, just this little bit to the effort for development of our beloved Tunisia.

As a son of the Tebourba area who had emigrated abroad, I announce the launching of the project, animated by the desire to carry it out by the best schedules possible, in the direction of better productivity at the lowest cost.

I pay great homage to the aid and solicitude which Governor Abdelhak Lassoued and the authorities of the region have generously given me. A single meeting with the regional authorities concluded with the launching of this project, which is important not only for Tunisia but for the Arab Maghreb.

The preliminary studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of this project and have led to the idea of creating an agro-industrial complex that bears the name "Tunisian agricultural and industrial complex." The technical studies and the financial aspects of this project were assigned to a well-known Franco-German consulting firm, with the collaboration of our financial experts and our competent agricultural engineers.

It emerges from the studies that the cost of the industrial project is estimated at D 5 million. At an advanced stage of the complex, we will be able to evaluate its volume and its production as follows:

- total cost of project: D 5 million;
- company capital (self-financed): D 1.2 million;
- surface area of complex: 8,950 m²;
- turnover to be realized, depending on the season: D 6 million in packed and frozen products, and D 200,000 as the value of the stored products.

An Ambitious Project

According to Sadok Ben Hamza [as published], the construction work on the complex will begin shortly at El Batan, near Tebourba. This industrial unit, which will permit better interaction between two complementary sectors, agriculture and industry, will probably be financed by the Islamic Bank, which is chaired by Prince Muhammad al-Faisal, friend of Tunisia and of President Bourguiba.

He intends to visit us soon, and had previously indicated that he is disposed to devote \$25 million to investments in Tunisia this year.

This bank excludes any form of interest in its exchanges with organisms or countries, but invests its money in the form of participation in projects. Prince al-Faisal had, for this purpose, submitted a request to the Ministry of Finance and Plan concerning the opening of an agency of the bank in Tunisia.

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